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The act of panhandling, commonly known as begging, is a constitutionally protected 
form of speech.1 But Washington’s cities are increasingly enacting ordinances that criminalize 
begging.2 The consequences of criminalizing begging are severe and include violations of 
First Amendment and due process rights. Indeed, these ordinances often outlaw peaceful 
and nonintrusive behavior protected by the First Amendment.3 Some advocates assert that 
since 2015, “100% of federal court cases have ruled bans/restrictions [on begging] are 
unconstitutional.”4 
 
Further, these laws do not contribute to a solution for homelessness; instead, they 
function to remove visible poverty and homelessness from sight. Due to the nature and 
penalties of these anti-begging ordinances, the debtor’s prison grows,5 and the cycle of 
homelessness continues.6    
 
Washington's Begging Restrictions 
 
The Homeless Rights Advocacy Project (HRAP) researched the laws of sixty-four cities 
across Washington State and found 121 ordinances that prohibit or restrict begging. An 
overwhelming number of these ordinances punish begging as a misdemeanor, inflicting on 
already vulnerable people ongoing and escalating collateral consequences.7 
                                                             
1 Katie Pilgram Neidig, The Demise of Anti-Panhandling Laws in America, 49 ST. MARY’S L.J. 543, 552 (2017).   
2 NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 11 (2017) [hereinafter NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017], 
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Housing-Not-Handcuffs (surveying 187 cities and finding laws punishing life-
sustaining conduct of homelessness people have increased).  
3 Telephone Interview with Mark Silverstein, Legal Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Colo. (Feb. 2016); see also 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (emphasizing that protected speech “does not become 
unprotected merely because it resembles” unlawful speech). 
4 See, e.g., Challenges to Bans of Restrictions on Panhandling, SACRAMENTO REG’L COAL. TO END HOMELESSNESS (Oct. 
2017). The fact sheet from Sacramento Regional Coalition to End Homelessness cites to data collected by the 
National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty found in Housing Not Handcuffs: A Litigation Manual.  
5 Court imposed debts, such as fines imposed due to violations of the law, push “people deeper into poverty and 
prolong[] their involvement with the criminal justice system.” AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH. & COLUMBIA 
LEGAL SERVS., MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISON: THE WAYS COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR 3 
(Feb. 2014), https://www.aclu-wa.org/docs/modern-day-debtors-prisons-washington (citing Katherine A. Beckett, 
Alexes M. Harris & Heather Evans, The Assessment and Consequences of Legal Financial Obligations in Washington 
State, WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N (2008), 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/2008LFO_report.pdf)). 
6 See NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2; HOMELESS RTS. ADVOC. PROJECT, The Criminalization of Homelessness: 
Additional Resources, SEATTLE UNIV. SCHL. LAW, [hereinafter HRAP], https://law.seattleu.edu/centers-and-
institutes/korematsu-center/initiatives/homeless-rights-advocacy-project/additional-resources (last visited Nov. 
25, 2017).  







Key findings include: 
 
• The vast majority of Washington cities punish begging: 86% of surveyed cities have 
at least one law criminalizing begging in their municipal codes. 
• 83% of these laws result in a misdemeanor if violated. Criminal convictions 
exacerbate homelessness.8 
• Begging restrictions are proliferating: approximately 2/3 of all begging ordinances 
were enacted after 2001. 
• Washington’s second most popular laws are “aggressive” begging restrictions. 
• In the 1990s, courts began invalidating prohibitions on peaceful begging as 
unconstitutional restrictions on free speech.  Many cities tried to circumvent this 
outcome by incorporating non-aggressive conduct into their so-called "aggressive 
begging" laws. 
• Only 2% of aggressive begging ordinances turn on the specific, objectively 
aggressive conduct of the person begging. 
• For the vast majority— 98% of aggressive begging laws—a violation can occur 
based solely on a bystander’s subjective perception.  
• If a bystander feels fearful or even feels compelled to give, such feelings may be 
enough to make begging criminal regardless of whether the person begging has 
done anything objectively aggressive. 
• 42% of all aggressive begging ordinances rely exclusively on a bystander’s 
subjective perception. 
• This reliance on whether a witness "subjectively" feels fear is highly problematic in 
light of well-established science proving people tend to feel fear simply when 
viewing a homeless person regardless of that person's conduct.9 
 
Enforcement of Washington's Begging Restrictions 
 
HRAP requested public records from eleven Washington cities10 to gain insight on 
citations for anti-begging laws within the last five years.  Only two cities—Marysville and 
Lakewood—provided data suggesting they formally cited individuals for violating specific 
begging laws within that timeframe.11 But the apparent lack of citation data from the 
remaining nine cities does not mean that these cities are not enforcing their anti-begging 
ordinances.  To the contrary, Washington cities are likely using informal (and invisible or not 
                                                             
8  See HRAP, supra note 6; Sara K. Rankin, The Influence of Exile, 76 MD. L. REV. 4, 33 (2016) [hereinafter Rankin 
2016]. 
9 Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Social Groups that Elicit Disgust are Differently Processed in mPFC, 2 SOC. 
COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 45, 45–51 (2007); Rankin 2016, supra note 8. 
10 Those cities are: Arlington, Bonney Lake, Centralia, Des Moines, Lakewood, Lake Stevens, Issaquah, Marysville, 
Mount Vernon, Tacoma, and Puyallup. Requests for records were submitted pursuant to Washington’s Public 
Records Act, RCW §42.56 et seq., on January 29, 2018 and January 30, 2018.  





tracked) “move-along” orders to extinguish the begging and push the visibly poor from public 
spaces.12  
 
Key findings of the enforcement data include:  
 
• Move-along orders may appear harmless, but they can still violate First Amendment 
and due process rights.13  
• The fact that move-along orders do not generate a ticket or other trackable 
evidence does not mean the laws are not being enforced. To the contrary, these 
orders are pervasive enforcement tools that are not reported or tracked.14  
• Move-along orders commonly chill free speech and are vulnerable to discriminatory 
use; however, those affected have no opportunity to challenge such orders and 
advocates cannot track them. 
• Lakewood issued fifty-one citations under two anti-begging ordinances between 
2013–2017.15  
• Lakewood severely punished these violations: 100% of individuals found guilty 
received a 90-day jail sentence; 60% of individuals found guilty for begging in 
restricted areas also received a fine ranging from $300–$500.16 
• Lakewood’s apparent lack of formal enforcement after 2016 suggests that the 
Washington Supreme Court decision in City of Lakewood v. Willis, which held 
provisions of Lakewood’s Restricted Areas17 ordinance unconstitutional,18 may have 
triggered a dramatic shift in Lakewood's enforcement policies.   
 
Key Case Studies 
 
This brief also reviews several case studies of specific Washington ordinances.19 The 
case studies reveal that many of these laws may not withstand judicial scrutiny under the 




                                                             
12 E.g., telephone Interview with Mark Solomon, Community Crime Prevention Specialist, Seattle Police Dep’t 
(Sept. 26, 2017); Damon Pesanti, No Tickets Issued Under Centralia’s New Panhandling Ban, CHRONICLE (July 10, 
2014), http://www.chronline.com/news/no-tickets-issued-under-centralia-s-new-panhandling-
ban/article_68f63e5a-085b-11e4-99fd-001a4bcf887a.html.  
13 See infra Part II, Section (B)(2).  
14 See, e.g., Christopher Herring, Dilara Yarbrough & Lisa Marie Alatorre, Pervasive Penalty: How the 
Criminalization of Homelessness Perpetuates Poverty (forthcoming 2018). 
15 Id.  
16 Infra Part II, Section (B)(2). 
17 Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A (2011).  
18 City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1064 (Wash. 2016). 






Key findings of the case studies include: 
 
• Lakewood has two ordinances21 that are unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny 
because they are overbroad content-based restrictions on speech. Both ordinances 
restrict substantial speech in traditional public fora—a space afforded the greatest 
First Amendment protections.22  
• Similarly, Des Moines has an ordinance prohibiting begging in public parks without 
first obtaining a permit.23 The ordinance is overbroad.24  
• Issaquah prohibits begging on public property from sunset to sunrise.25 This law is 
an overbroad restriction that prohibits substantial speech within a traditional public 
forum.26 It is also vulnerable to a vagueness challenge based on the ambiguity of 
the meaning of “sunset” and “sunrise.”27  
• Tacoma has two overlapping ordinances, one prohibiting coercive solicitation28 and 
another prohibiting pedestrian interference.29 These laws effectively prohibit the 
same behavior, except that coercive solicitation occurs only when an individual 
blocks pedestrian traffic while making a solicitation.30 The penalty for coercive 
solicitation is a gross misdemeanor, resulting in a higher fine and a higher possible 
jail sentence than pedestrian interference.31   
• In other words, Tacoma punishes the same conduct more seriously if the offender is 
begging, even peacefully. Peaceful begging is protected free speech; it should not 
be punished as an aggravating factor. 
 
Many Washington cities are unlikely to withstand a constitutional challenge to their 
anti-begging laws.32 Recent jurisprudence provides strong guidance for cities to consider in re-
evaluating their anti-begging laws. This brief recommends cities:33  
 
▪ Repeal ordinances that restrict peaceful begging; 
▪ Repeal aggressive begging ordinances and instead rely on existing ordinances to 
address truly aggressive behavior;  
▪ Campaign for and invest in non-punitive solutions to address poverty; and 
▪ Recognize begging as a plea for help protected by the United States Constitution. 
 
                                                             
21 Lakewood MC §§ 9A.04.020A (2011) & 9A.05.050 (2010). 
22 Infra Part III, Section (B)(2).  
23 Des Moines MC § 19.08.030(7) (1988). 
24 Infra Part III, Section (A)(2). 
25 Issaquah MC § 9.45.040 (2008). 
26 Infra Part III, Section (B). 
27 Id.  
28 Tacoma MC § 8.13A.040 (2007). 
29 Tacoma MC § 8.13.030 (1991). 
30 Tacoma MC § 8.13A.040 (2007). 
31 Tacoma MC § 8.13A.060 (2007). 
32 Id. 




Many cities that restrict begging are infringing on the constitutional rights of their most 
vulnerable residents and are contributing to the cycle of poverty and homelessness. But cities 
play a crucial role in protecting the constitutional rights of all of their residents, and they can be 






The greatest misunderstanding about so-called ‘panhandling’ is about what it actually is. 
 It is one citizen asking another citizen for help. It’s that basic.34 
 
The freedom of speech is one of the most cherished constitutional rights throughout 
American history, but this right is routinely denied to visibly poor people with dire 
consequences.35 Nationally, cities are increasingly criminalizing life-sustaining behavior, 
infringing on the constitutional rights of individuals experiencing homelessness.36 Similarly, 
municipalities are increasingly drafting laws that criminalize begging, purporting to justify such 
laws as necessary public health and safety measures.37 
 
Research has also shown that local 
municipalities are widely embracing anti-
begging laws across the country.38 For 
example, as of 2017, laws prohibiting 
begging citywide have increased by 43% 
since 2006, and laws that prohibit begging 
in particular public spaces have increased by 
7%.39 The increasing popularity of these 
restrictions is troubling because they 
suffocate the First Amendment rights of 
vulnerable populations and strip away the 
constitutional right to due process. These 
begging restrictions further prohibit 
constitutionally protected behavior and 
have serious consequences that continue 
the cycle of homelessness.  
                                                             
34 Teresa Wiltz, Anti-Panhandling Laws Spread, Face Legal Challenges, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 12, 2015) 
[hereinafter Wiltz 2015] (quoting Ken Paulson, President of FIRST AMEND. CTR), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/11/12/anti-panhandling-laws-spread-
face-legal-challenges.  
35 See generally NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 9 (discussing “why laws criminally or civilly punishing 
homeless persons’ life-sustaining activity are ineffective . . . and how they often violate homeless persons’ 
constitutional and human rights”). 
36  Id. at 11. 
37 Justin Olson & Scott MacDonald, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, WASHINGTON’S WAR ON 
THE VISIBLY POOR: A SURVEY OF CRIMINALIZING ORDINANCES & THEIR ENFORCEMENT 5 (Sara Rankin ed. 2015) 
(emphasizing that municipalities are increasingly enacting ordinances that criminalize homelessness for the 
purported purpose of maintaining “health, safety, or general public order”). 
38 NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2. 
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Yet, there is no harm directly associated with begging alone.40 Courts have recognized 
begging as a form of speech protected by the First Amendment,41 involving many speech 
interests including “the communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of 
views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes.”42 But policymakers often perceive even peaceful 
begging as a problem because it is a visual reminder of homelessness or human desperation 
that makes people uncomfortable.43 Whether done consciously or unconsciously, the 
criminalization of visible poverty is well documented.44   
 
Between 2017 and 2018, HRAP examined the municipal codes of sixty-four cities within 
Washington State to understand the scope and consequences of begging restrictions,45 the 
most extensive survey of its kind in the nation. This brief finds that, despite begging being a 
constitutionally protected form of speech, Washington cities have employed many techniques 
to curb even peaceful requests for help while attempting to avoid First Amendment scrutiny. 
The study revealed 121 ordinances that can be organized into four distinct categories of 




Particularly, cities have learned to manipulate geography by creating buffer zones 
around specific public spaces where begging is illegal or by implementing specific distance 
restrictions from areas like crosswalks, intersections, and entrances to buildings.46 Cities also 
                                                             
40 Telephone Interview with Nancy Talner, Staff Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Wash. (Oct. 3, 2017). 
41  Neidig, supra note 1.   
42 Megan Smith, Note, The Constitutionality of Panhandling Ordinances: Making “Cents” out of Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, 35 J.L. & COM. 255, 257 (2017) (citing Schaumbuxg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 44 U.S. 620, 629 (1980)).   
43 Talner, supra note 40. 
44  HRAP, supra note 6. 
45 The term “begging restrictions” is interchangeable throughout this brief with the term “anti-begging laws” or 
“anti-begging ordinances.” 
46 Rankin 2016, supra note 8 (writing that “city and state governments ‘have learned to manipulate geography in a 
manner that now seriously threatens basic First Amendment principles’” (quoting Timothy Zick, Speech and 
Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 584, 585 (2006))); id. at 33 n.168 (“Political dissent has become spatial tactics’ 
principal casualty.” (quoting Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. at 589–90))). 
 
Four Types of Begging Restrictions 
Types of 
Restrictions




implement time restrictions on begging wherein speech is prohibited between specific hours of 
the day.47 Finally, cities implement manner restrictions in the form of aggressive begging 
ordinances, which purport to prohibit threatening and aggressive behavior but often prohibit 
peaceful harmless speech.48 To avoid heightened scrutiny, municipalities have broadly drafted 
these laws in an attempt to mitigate First Amendment jurisprudence, while still imposing 
burdensome limitations on protected speech.49  
 
It strains credibility to suggest that these laws target anyone apart from the visible poor 
or people experiencing homelessness. Just as importantly, these laws are unnecessary because 
they frequently overlap with existing laws applicable to the population at large.50 For example, 
objectively aggressive behavior is already prohibited by criminal laws such as harassment and 
assault.51 Yet aggressive begging ordinances are the second most common form of begging 
restrictions throughout Washington.52 Moreover, the majority of aggressive begging laws 
hinge on subjective perceptions of the person being solicited for help—for example, a person 
might be guilty of aggressive begging if someone listening to them feels intimidated, 
regardless of the means and manner of the solicitation.53  
 
Perception-based begging restrictions are 
particularly problematic because studies show that many 
people are deeply afraid of visibly poor people.55 
Neurological tests show exposure to a person bearing 
some hallmark of homelessness can “[elicit] the worst 
kind of prejudice – disgust and contempt” in those who 
witness it.56 These studies highlight the critical flaw in 
anti-begging laws rooted in the reaction of bystanders. 
Few people are put in a state of fear when approached by a volunteer with a clipboard seeking 
donations for a social initiative; yet, a similar interaction committed by a visibly poor person 
can cause dramatically negative reactions. While these laws are frequently adopted “in a 
                                                             
47 E.g., Issaquah MC § 9.45.040 (2008); see, e.g., Jessica So, Scott MacDonald, Justin Olson & Ryan Mansell, Seattle 
University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, LIVING AT THE INTERSECTION: LAWS & VEHICLE RESIDENCY 5 (Sara 
Rankin ed. 2016) (asserting that laws restricting the parking of cars between 2:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. are used to 
push vehicle residents out of neighborhoods). 
48 Infra Part III, Section D.   
49 Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 34 (citing Joseph Mead, The First Amendment Protection of Charitable Speech, 76 
OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 59 (2015)).  
50 See infra Part I, Section C. 
51 Id. 
52 Infra Part II (data on file with author). 
53 Id. 
54 Silverstein, supra note 3; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002). 
55 Sara K. Rankin, A Homeless Bill of Rights (Revolution), 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 383, 390 (2015) [hereinafter Rankin 
2015] (citing Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging Responses to 
Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 10, 848 (2006)). 





ordinances often outlaw 
peaceful and nonintrusive 






purported effort to outlaw intimidating, threatening, and aggressive conduct," more often 
than not they threaten peaceful behavior for the sake of deeply rooted systemic discomfort 
directed at visible poverty.57 Additionally, between vague aggressive begging restrictions and 
broad time and place restrictions, citizens often have no realistic way of knowing how to 
conform their behavior to the confines of the law. The end result is that protected speech—the 
right to simply ask for help—is savagely curtailed under the law.58 
 
 This brief is organized into three parts.  Part I overviews First Amendment and due 
process law often disregarded by these begging restrictions; Part II discusses the 
criminalization of begging in Washington, covering new data regarding anti-begging laws 
across the state; and Part III analyzes select begging restrictions in Washington to consider 
whether these laws would withstand judicial scrutiny. This brief concludes with 

















                                                             
57 Silverstein, supra note 3; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002). 
58 Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 33–35. 
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PART I: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW 
 
A basic tenet of First Amendment law is that the government cannot restrict speech 
because it disagrees with who the speaker is or what the speaker is saying.61 However, the law 
permits "content-neutral" time, place, and manner restrictions.62 It is within this narrow 



















Although anti-begging ordinances disproportionately violate the constitutional rights of 
people experiencing homelessness, the public rarely views these laws as discriminatory.63 This 
blind spot exists, in part, because of the deeply-rooted human instinct to avoid evidence of 
poverty and human desperation.64 Studies show that people react to visible evidence of 
poverty with uneasiness, disgust, and fear.65 Due to the public’s aversion to visible poverty, 
local governments work to purge visible poverty from public spaces—regardless of whether 
                                                             
59 Infra Part I, Section B. 
60 Photograph by Steve Baker, FLICKR CREATIVE COMMONS (Apr. 27, 2016), 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/littlebiglens/26682208695/in/photostream/.  
61 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
62 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
63 See generally NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 21 (2014) [hereinafter NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014], 
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place.  
64 See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (1st ed. 
2013) (discussing blind-spots as phenomenon of unconscious bias).  
65 Rankin 2015, supra note 55 (citing Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: 
Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 10, 848 (2006).  
 
The very nature of begging restrictions prohibit an 

















discriminatory and unconstitutional effects are intended. When these restrictions prevent 
individuals from asking for help or obstruct their access to due process of the law they can 
trigger heightened judicial scrutiny.66 These popular anti-begging ordinances target visibly 
poor individuals, and courts are increasingly striking down anti-begging ordinances as 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.67 
 
A. Stigmatizing and Criminalizing Visible Poverty 
 
If history teaches us anything, it is that distinguishing between  
the worthy and unworthy poor never withstands the test of time.68 
 
Laws that restrict peaceful begging are among many forms of criminalization 
influenced by unconscious biases against visible poverty.69 Criminalization laws are often 
fueled by stereotypes that poor people are to blame for their circumstances.70 Although an 
estimated 20% of people experiencing homelessness actually work,71 anti-begging laws 
encourage the stereotype that people experiencing homelessness are lazy and inferior to 
housed individuals.72 Anti-begging ordinances are further fueled by the notion that giving 
money to people experiencing homelessness “enables addicts and prevents them from  
  
                                                             
66 E.g., Speet v. Schute, 726 F.3d 867, 878 (6th Cir. 2013); Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 551 (4th 
Cir. 2013); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000); Loper v. New York City Police Dep’t., 999 F.2d 699, 
704 (2d Cir. 1993); Wiltz 2015, supra note 34; see also Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 17 (citing United States 
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990)) (stating that “[s]olicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the 
First Amendment”). 
67 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 197 (D. Mass. 2015) (finding Lowell’s downtown begging and 
aggressive begging restrictions unconstitutional under the First Amendment); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. 
Supp. 3d 218, 233–34, 237–38 (D. Mass. 2015) (noting the failure of similar aggressive begging ordinances to survive 
strict scrutiny); Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1173, (2016) 
(finding anti-panhandling law to be a form of content discrimination); Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 
1276, 1292 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2015) (holding that aggressive begging ordinance was not necessary to serve 
important interest of public safety); City of Lakewood v. Willis, 37 P.3d 1056 (Wash. 2016) (holding that two 
provisions of anti-begging ordinance imposed “content-based speech restrictions in a substantial number of 
traditional public forums”). 
68 PHILIPPE BOURGOIS & JEFF SCHONBERG, RIGHTEOUS DOPEFIEND 316 (2009).  
69 Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 36 (“The increasing prevalence of anti-begging laws is a helpful example of how 
unconscious biases against poor people and deep-rooted associations between visible poverty and danger can 
become manifest in the law.”); see also HRAP, supra note 6.  
70 Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 1. 
71 THE U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, HUNGER & HOMELESSNESS SURV.: A STAT. REP. ON HUNGER & HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S 
CITIES (Dec. 2015), http://chicagohelpinitiative.org/assets/uploads/files/1221-report-hhreport.pdf (18% of 
homeless people are employed).  




getting help” or from getting a job.73 The justice system often supports this view by upholding 
laws that “push visibly poor people out of public space merely because visible evidence of 
human desperation tends to undermine feelings of safety.”74 Despite these notions, many 
people experiencing poverty are forced to beg because they have no reasonable alternative. A 
study of panhandling in Toronto, Canada, found that 48% of panhandlers did not enjoy 
panhandling because it was “degrading,” and 70% “would prefer a minimum-wage job,” but 
thought they could not handle one “because of mental illness, physical disability, or lack of 
skills.”75  
 
Included in the discussion of 
whether begging should be protected is 
how the stereotypes surrounding 
homelessness impact both the law and the 
level of tolerance and empathy from the 
community. This discussion is related to 
the stereotypes and unconscious biases 
discussed above, but it is often focused on 
individuals who give to panhandlers do not 
know how their money will be spent. One 
study in San Francisco found data that 
suggests that the funds donated to 
panhandlers are most often used for “good” purposes.77 For example, the study found that 
                                                             
73 Wiltz 2015, supra note 34. But see NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2 at 32 (estimating that “44% of all homeless 
people are employed on a temporary or full-time basis”); U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, HUNGER & HOMELESSNESS SURV., 
supra note 71. See Aaron Burkhalter, Signs of the Times, REAL CHANGE (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://realchangenews.org/2013/12/19/signs-times (explaining how cities, like Aberdeen, discourage people from 
giving donations to panhandlers by erecting signs that display “Keep the change. Don’t support panhandling. The 
majority of your change goes to Drugs & Alcohol. Help more by giving to charity.”). But see JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE 
POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1993) (quashing persistent “myths” that homeless people are 
“somehow responsible for their own poverty” by explaining that “[once] we acknowledge . . . drugs, alcoholism, or 
mental illness . . . are not sufficient explanations of homelessness, we can begin to explore the real causes”); 
Marie-Eve Sylvestre & Celine Bellot, Challenging Discriminatory and Punitive Responses to Homelessness in Canada, 
in ADVANCING SOCIAL RIGHTS IN CANADA 1, 7 (Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter eds., Irwin Law 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484975 (explaining how “prejudice and stereotypes obscure the social, economic, and 
political causes of homelessness and thwart efforts to address these underlying factors by blaming those who are 
its victims, imputing personal characteristics of moral inferiority, laziness, dishonesty, and criminality which, in 
turn, provide an ‘explanation’ for the problem of homelessness”). 
74 Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 25 (citing Beckett & Herbert, supra note 65, at 21 (quotation omitted)). 
75  Rohit Bose & Stephen W. Hwang, Income and Spending Patterns Among Panhandlers, 167(5) CMAJ 477-479 
(2002), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC121964/. Interestingly, 43% of participants relayed that 
they did enjoy panhandling because of the opportunity to “meet people,” while 9% were undecided. Id. 
76 Heather Knight, The City’s Panhandlers Tell Their Own Stories, SF GATE (Oct. 27, 2013), 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/The-city-s-panhandlers-tell-their-own-stories-4929388.php.  






94% of the money donated to panhandlers was used for food, and in contrast, only 44% of 
individuals used some of the money donated for drugs and/or alcohol.78  
 
Such stereotypes are often advanced by business owners who complain about visible 
poverty in the local business districts and lobby for criminalization of homelessness.79 
Businesses frequently argue that the presence of visibly poor people scares away customers, 
especially when begging occurs.80  For many business owners “[t]he hope is simply that if 
homeless people can be made to disappear, nothing will stand in the way of realizing the 
dream of prosperity, social harmony, and perpetual economic growth.”81 However, both 
business owners and members of the public fail to realize that absent employment or family 
support, begging may be a person’s “best option for obtaining the money that they need to 
purchase food, public transportation fare, medication, or other necessities.”82  
 
These stereotypes become especially harmful when cities publicly advance and 
reinforce them. For example, Arlington and Marysville recently joined to create a flier that 
identifies panhandling as a problem and urges individuals to keep their “wallet closed” when 
approached by panhandlers because “you can’t know how it will be spent.”83 The flier identifies 
panhandling as a problem that “adversely impacts our cities’ and neighborhoods’ images, local 
businesses, and perception of public safety.”84  
                                                             
78 Id.  
79 NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 31, 32; Joe Palazzolo & Alejandro Lazo, Denver’s Bus’s Take Active Role in 
Homeless Policies, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/denvers-businesses-take-active-role-
in-homeless-policies-1476639643 (explaining Denver’s business community successfully advocated for “homeless  
parking meter installations” which “encouraged people to feed parking meters that collected money for charity, 
rather than give to the homeless directly”).  
80 See Theresa Wiltz, Do New Laws Help or Hurt the Homeless? PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 17, 2014) [hereinafter 
Wiltz 2014], http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/11/17/do-new-laws-help-or-
hurt-the-homelessness. 
81 Don Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Implications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United 
States, RADICAL J. GEOGRAPHY 303, 307 (1997), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8330.00048/epdf.  
82 NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 25. 
83 City of Arlington & City of Marysville, This Community Cares, 
http://www.arlingtonwa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/918 (retrieved Oct. 17, 2017). 






Harmful stereotypes in action: flier distributed by Arlington and Marysville.85 
 
A common theme propelled by proponents of anti-begging ordinances is that they 
overestimate how feasible it is for individuals experiencing homelessness to find and maintain 
employment. Immutable characteristics and uncontrollable circumstances, including mental 
illness, addiction, single parenthood, lack of hygiene facilities, lack of sleep,86 and evidence of a 
criminal record for engaging in life-sustaining activities can make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to obtain an adequate job.87 Potential employers often hesitate when they see that an 
applicant has no permanent mailing address or reliable ability to maintain his or her hygiene.88  
 
                                                             
85  Id. The flier has been cropped for purposes of implementation into this brief. The entire flier is found in the 
appendix of this brief. Infra Appendix, Part I. 
86 NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOMES NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 43 (2009) [hereinafter NAT’L LAW CTR. 2009], http://timefolds.com/nch/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/CrimzReport_2009.pdf (explaining how prohibitions on overnight sleeping force people 
experiencing homelessness to “stay up at night and sleep during the day, making it even more difficult for them to 
find employment”); see NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 24. 
87 See Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 
27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 261–66 (1994) (internal citations omitted); NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 13, 24, 30, 
36, 38; LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of 
Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 373, 374 (2000) (explaining how “[m]entally ill 
offenders are often inextricably trapped in a ‘revolving door’ of petty crime, incarceration, release, homelessness, 
and re-imprisonment”). 
88 See Kincaid v. City of Fresno, No. 106CV-1445, 2006 WL 3542732, at *40 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2006). Irreparable 
harm results from these city-sanctioned practices, including “harm to homeless people's security and dignity.”  Id. 
For example, people experiencing homelessness “lose medicine and health supplies; tents and bedding that 
shelter them from the elements; clothing and hygiene supplies; identification documents and other personal 
papers; the tools by which they try to make a meager income; and items of immeasurable sentimental value.” Id. 
Without important identification documents, medication, clothing, and hygiene supplies, people experiencing 





Putting aside individual responses to begging, cities should resist criminalization.  
Criminalizing begging can exacerbate homelessness and make it more difficult for people to 
escape. Once saddled with a criminal record, people experiencing homelessness are further 
hindered from accessing employment, housing, and public benefits.89 Instead of exacerbating 
this cycle, municipalities should address the underlying problems of people experiencing 
homelessness, such as inadequate mental health and housing benefits.90 The cyclical nature of 
criminalizing homelessness is costly for taxpayers because people experiencing homelessness 
are consistently cycled through the criminal justice system when non-punitive alternatives, 
such as affordable housing, are pragmatically and economically more effective solutions.91  
 
 
                                                             
89 Drew Sena, Note, A Constitutional Critique on the Criminalization of Panhandling in Washington State, 41 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 287, 289 (2017). 
90 NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 45.  
91  Id. at 34 (stating that “costs resulting from criminalization measures are present at multiple stages of the 
criminal justice process,” and people experiencing homelessness are often unable to pay, which results in 
increased jail time, suspension of their driver’s license, and poor credit); Josh Howard & David Tran, Seattle 
University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, AT WHAT COST: THE MINIMUM COST OF CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS 
IN SEATTLE & SPOKANE  (Sara K. Rankin ed. 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602530. See generally Ariel Schreiber & 
Becca Butler-Dines, Too High a Price What Criminalizing Homelessness Costs Colorado: Denver City Spotlight, 
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/homeless-advocacy-policy-project/2-16-16-Final-Report.pdf (accessed on 




















Regardless of studies that challenge stereotypes surrounding homelessness, the debate 
over whether to give to panhandlers is a futile conversation. All individuals value essential 
freedoms of autonomy and independence. “People have the right to be free agents . . . and 
limitations on their choice must be justified 
in terms of protecting their rights or the 
rights of others.”93 The “dilemma” of 
whether to give money to someone asking 
for help because that person might use the 
money as they choose should give us pause. 
The real dilemma should not center on 
passing judgment or how to limit the 
freedom and choices of others; instead, it 
should focus on how each of us will respond 
to another human being’s request for help.  
 
And regardless of how anyone feels 
about homelessness “public intolerance or 
animosity cannot be the basis for 
abridgment of . . .constitutional freedoms.”94 
Cities may not enact laws that contain “an 
obvious invitation to discriminatory 
enforcement against those whose 
association together is ‘annoying’ because 
their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical 
appearance is resented by the majority of 
their fellow citizens.”95  
 
B. Begging for Free Speech 
 
If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,  
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea  
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.96 
 
Laws that prohibit or limit an individual’s First Amendment right to ask for help are 
subject to significant constitutional challenges. It is central to the First Amendment that in 
                                                             
92 The Editorial Board, Opinion, The Pope on Panhandling: Give Without Worry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/opinion/the-pope-on-panhandling-give-without-worry.html?_r=0.  
93 BARRY JAY SELTSER & DONALD EARL MILLER, HOMELESS FAMILIES: THE STRUGGLE FOR DIGNITY 107 (1993). 
94 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971). 
95 Id. at 616; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (demanding a greater degree of specificity when “a 
statute’s literal scope . . . is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment”). 
96 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 
 
“[Pope Francis] said that giving 
something to someone in need  
is ‘always right’. . . But what if 
someone uses the money for,  
say, a glass of wine?” 
 
“His answer: If ‘a glass of wine is the 
only happiness he has in life, that’s 
O.K. Instead, ask yourself, what do 
you do on the sly? What happiness do 
you seek in secret?’” 
 
“Another way to look at it, he said, is 
to recognize how you are the ‘luckier’ 
one, with a home, a spouse and 
children, and then ask why your 
responsibility to help should be 





public fora,97 people “might be ‘confronted with an uncomfortable message’ that they cannot 
avoid.”98 Indeed, the First Amendment seeks to protect speech that others find disagreeable, 
uncomfortable, or even offensive.99 And yet, because others find even peaceful requests for 
help to be distasteful or uncomfortable, cities all over the country effectively block visibly poor 
people from exercising their First Amendment rights.    
 
 Anti-begging laws create hurdles that people experiencing homelessness are unlikely to 
overcome. Time and place restrictions on begging create invisible, irregular, and expanding 
patchworks of permissible and impermissible zones where begging may not occur—such as 
laws restricting begging after dark100 or begging near crosswalks and intersections.101  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently made it 
tougher for cities to restrict begging. The First 
Amendment prohibits the restriction of speech 
based on “its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content.”103 In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the 
Supreme Court clarified that courts must 
determine whether a law is content-based “on its 
face” or content-neutral before determining 
whether the purported “purpose and justifications 
for the law are content-based.”104 This test means 
that courts must evaluate the plain language of a 
law to determine whether it targets a particular 
message or purpose before considering any purported justifications for the law. As a result, a 
court can determine that a law is unconstitutional based on the language of the law alone. If 
the law regulates speech based on the speaker’s message or the purpose for which the speaker 
is communicating, the law is content based; content-neutral justifications or rationales will not 
change this fact.105  
 
Reed is also significant because it clarified which speech restrictions are content-based. 
Since Reed, content-based restrictions include not only laws that regulate a speaker’s specific 
message, but also laws that regulate speech based on its “function or purpose.”106 Put another 
way, a law is content-based if an officer must evaluate what the speaker is communicating to 
determine whether her speech is restricted.107 In contrast, a law is content-neutral if it 
regulates an individual’s ability to speak in public without referencing the specific message the 
individual is communicating.108  
 
Courts should now presume that explicit anti-
begging laws are content-based.110 The very nature of 
anti-begging laws prohibit an individual from conveying 
their message of needing help. Whatever the manner a 
person asks for help, the act of panhandling itself is a 
form of expressive communication,111 and content-based 
anti-begging laws endanger the “right to engage fellow 
102 
 
Courts should presume 
that explicit anti-begging 
laws are content-based 

















human beings with the hope of receiving aid and compassion.”112 These laws impermissibly 
filter speech based on the message communicated because they require authorities to 
“examine the content of the message that is conveyed to determine whether a violation has 
occurred.”113 Put differently, these laws do not prohibit all speech in certain places or at certain 
times; they prohibit certain contents of speech. 
 
Classifications of laws as either content-neutral or content-based have already led to 
markedly different outcomes in begging cases.114 If a law is content-based it is subject to strict 
                                                             
97 “Public foras are places that have been “held out for general use by the public for speech-related purposes.” 
What is a Public Forum?, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017),  
http://www.firstamendmentschools.org/freedoms/faq.aspx?id=13012. Traditional public forums consist of 
sidewalks, street corners, and public parks. Id. 
98 McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 189 (2015) (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 
(2014)). 
99 Rankin 2016, supra note 8.  
100 See, e.g., Auburn MC § 9.18.050(E) (2002); Centralia MC § 10.37.040 (2014); Issaquah MC § 9.45.040 (2008); 
Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010); Marysville MC § 6.37.045 (2014); Monroe MC § 9.35.040 (2008); Sunnyside MC 
§ 9.86.050(E) (1978). 
101 See, e.g., Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(6)(b) (2002) (unlawful to beg “at an intersection controlled by lighted traffic 
signals, where that activity is between or involves a person or persons located in a sidewalk or along a public 
roadway and a person or persons in or on a vehicle traveling on a public roadway”) (emphasis added); Sunnyside 
MC § 9.86.050(B) (1978) (“unlawful to beg “within 10 feet of any marked pedestrian crosswalk, within 10 feet of 
any entrance or exit of any building then in use by the general public, or from the area of any sidewalk within 10 
feet of its intersection with an alley or publicly used driveway”). 
102 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 
(1972)). 
103 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226 (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). 
104 Id. at 2228 (noting that the appellate court skipped this “crucial first step”) (clarifying that “strict scrutiny applies 
either when a law is content-based on its face or when the purpose and justification for the law are content-based,” 
and mandating that courts “evaluate each question” before concluding the law is content-neutral). 
105 See id. at 2227. 
106 Id. (clarifying that content-based laws include those that regulate the actual content of the message as well as 
laws that are “more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose”). 
107 See id. at 2226-27; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994) (explaining that 
“laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature's speaker preference 
reflects a content preference”). 
108 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2223.  
109 See City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016) (finding a Lakewood begging ordinance to be 
content-based under Reed and joining “the overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed similar anti-
begging laws after Reed”). 
110 See id. The assertion that anti-begging laws are presumed to be content-based applies only to laws that 
specifically target begging, not laws that broadly target all types of speech. 
111 McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 184 (2015). 
112 Id. (citing Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 424 Mass. 918, 679 (1997)). 
113 Id. (citing McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014)). 
114 Compare Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 71 (1st Cir. 2014) (upholding two anti-begging ordinances as 
content-neutral and serving legitimate government interests), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2887, with Thayer v. City of 
Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 233, 238 (D. Mass. 2015) (in light of Reed, finding same ordinances as content-based 





scrutiny—the highest and most exacting level of judicial scrutiny a court can apply—“regardless 
of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the 
idea contained’ in the regulated speech.”115 Strict scrutiny requires the government to prove 
that the law serves a compelling interest and is narrowly designed to achieve that interest.116  
 
On the other hand, if a law is content-neutral, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny—
meaning the law is more likely to survive judicial review. Normally, to withstand intermediate 
scrutiny, the State must prove that the law furthers an important government interest by 
means that are “substantially related” to that interest.117 However, the Washington State 
Constitution includes more stringent free speech protections that require content-neutral 
restrictions to serve a compelling government interest.118 Essentially, in Washington those 
content-neutral laws must be aimed at achieving a compelling government interest, which is 
the same standard applied to content-based laws under strict scrutiny. 
 
 
Strict Scrutiny                                                 Intermediate Scrutiny119 
 
Applies to content-based laws. 
 
Applies to content-neutral laws. 
State must prove the law is 
narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling interest. 
State must prove the law is 






                                                             
115 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015); see also Telephone interview with Sarah Wunsch, Deputy 
Legal Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mass. (Feb. 26, 2016) (emphasizing that the government’s motive is 
irrelevant to the content-neutrality analysis). 
116 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2218 (2015). 
117 LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, WEX, INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intermediate_scrutiny (last visited Nov. 25, 2017). 
118 Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 937 P.2d 154, 163(1997) (citing Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918 (1986)).  
119 LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 117 . 
120 The Washington Supreme Court has raised the standard for content-neutral laws based on the State 
constitution. Collier v. City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Wash. 1993) (holding “[w]e diverge from the Supreme 
Court on the state interest element of the time, place, and manner test, ‘as we believe restrictions on speech can 
be imposed consistent with [the State constitution] only upon a showing a compelling state interest.’” (quoting 




Cities can no longer simply invoke phrases such as “public safety” or “public health” as 
justifications for begging restrictions unless the cities can prove a clear link between the 
begging restriction and the specific way the restriction serves the purported interest.121 In 
other words, the city bears the burden of demonstrating that its justifications for regulating 
begging are not mere pretext for suppressing requests for help.122 To meet this burden, the city 
must show that the harms it seeks to mitigate are real and that “the regulation will in fact 
alleviate these harms in a material way.”123  
 
These justifications must be genuine and supported by a strong basis of “meaningful 
evidence-based data” rather than “shoddy data”124 that is “hypothesized or invented post hoc 
in response to litigation.”125 Thus, Reed is a promising tool to fight unreasonable begging 
restrictions.126   
 
Consider one example of laws that commonly 
control who can speak and where they can speak: laws 
that require permits for begging.128 Requiring a permit to 
engage in protected speech is “a dramatic departure from 
our national heritage and constitutional tradition.”129 
Because these laws require the speaker to obtain a permit 
before speaking, courts may classify the laws as creating a 
prior restraint on speech.130 A prior restraint exists when speech is “conditioned on the prior 
approval of public officials.”131 Prior restraints are problematic because they carry the risk of 
the government officials censoring speech based on a whim; thus, permit requirements often 
risk suppressing speech based on the content or the identity of the speaker.132 Any system of 
prior restraint carries “a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”133 
 
                                                             
121 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014) (“A narrowly tailored law will have a “close fit between 
ends and means”); McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 190 (noting that protecting public safety and preventing 
coercion may constitute compelling governmental interests insofar as “the legislature has a strong basis in 
evidence to support that justification” (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996))). 
122 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994); see also McLaughlin v. City of 
Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 188 n.7. 
123 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 624. 
124 McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 187 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002)). 
125 Id. at 190 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). 
126 See Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 37–38.  
127 McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 187 (D. Mass. 2015) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda 
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002)). 
128 E.g., Lakewood MC § 9A.05.030 (2010). See Part III for a detailed discussion of these permitting requirements.  
129 Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002). 
130 See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992). 
131 State v. Dean, 866 N.E.2d 1134, 1143 (1st Cir. 2007). 
132 Id. 
133 Carroll v. Pres. &  Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 
U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). 
 







Even content-neutral permitting laws must meet certain criteria to overcome this 
presumption.134 If a permitting law regulates when, where, or how individuals may speak in 
public, the law must: (1) not give overly broad discretion to government officials; (2) not 
regulate the content of one’s speech; and (3) leave alternative means of communication open 
to those whose speech is affected.135 Municipalities can regulate some speech activities 
through permits,136 but permitting laws must be narrowly tailored.137  
 
A narrowly tailored law does not “burden 
substantially more speech than is necessary” to 
achieve the compelling government interest 
motivating the law.139 The city bears this burden 
by showing it is using the least restrictive means 
to further its interest.140 Cities fail to meet this 
burden when reasonable alternatives exist to 
address the issue at hand. For example, in Blitch 
v. City of Slidwell, the city passed a content-
based ordinance that required panhandlers to 
register with the police and to wear identification 
before asking others for a monetary donation.141 
The city argued that the law was necessary to 
enforce its current aggressive begging laws.142 The plaintiffs, three individuals that panhandled 
in Slidell, filed a suit alleging that the ordinance violated the First Amendment.143 The district 
court held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment 
because it was a prior restraint on protected speech not narrowly tailored to meet the city’s 
public safety interests.144 The court found there were less restrictive, alternative means the city 
could pursue in achieving its enforcement interest.145 Rather than unnecessarily burdening 
protected speech, the city could allocate police resources to enforce already existing 
                                                             
134 See Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 129–30 (“Public fora have achieved a special status in law; the government 
must bear an extraordinarily heavy burden to regulate speech in such locales.”) 
135 Id. at 130–31. 
136 See, e.g., Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574, 576 (1941) (parade permitting scheme upheld as 
regulating time, place, and manner rather than speech).  
137 Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130. 
138 Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1041 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New 
York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165–66 (2002)). 
139 Id. (citing to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). 
140 Blitch v. City of Slidell, 260 F. Supp. 3d 656 (E.D. Louisiana, 2017). 
141 Id. at 659. 
142 Id. 





“[I]t is offensive—not only to the 
values protected by the First 
Amendment, but to the very 
notion of a free society— 
that in the context of everyday 
public discourse, a citizen must 
first inform the government of 
her desire to speak to her 
neighbors and then obtain a 





ordinances against aggressive panhandling or install cameras at frequently used locations to 
identify aggressive panhandlers.146  
 
C. Begging for Due Process 
 
The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual 
 against arbitrary action of government.147 
 
Besides free speech concerns, anti-begging laws may violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.148 The Constitution requires that no individual “be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of the law.”149 Essentially, due process prohibits 
cities from “arbitrarily or unfairly depriving individuals of their basic constitutional rights.”150 
Due process issues arise when anti-begging laws allow for discriminatory enforcement, when 
overlapping laws have differing penalties, and when violations of aggressive begging laws are 
determined only by the subjective perception of the witness and not on some objectively 
aggressive conduct. 
 
First, specificity of the law is important 
for protecting individuals experiencing 
homelessness because vague laws allow for 
discriminatory enforcement against 
marginalized and disfavored groups.151 When a 
law regulates expression protected by the First 
Amendment, courts require legislatures to set 
specific and clear guidelines for law 
enforcement officials to prevent arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.152 To survive 
                                                             
146 Id. 
147 Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 588 (1974). 
148 Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1453–54 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 78 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1996), 
opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of reh'g and 
reh'g en banc (Sept. 17, 1996), and aff'd, 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc 
(Sept. 17, 1996) (invalidating a section of aggressive begging ordinance which prescribed circumstances to be 
considered in determining a beggar's intent as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague).  
149 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § I.  
150 Due Process of Law, FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/due+process+of+law (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2017). 
151 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971); see also Javier Ortiz & Matthew Dick, Seattle University 
Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, THE WRONG SIDE OF HISTORY: A COMPARISON OF MODERN & HISTORICAL 
CRIMINALIZATION LAWS 17 (Sara Rankin ed. 2015) (describing America’s disturbing heritage of using vague laws as 
an “effective tool for the removal of unwanted people from public space because of the broad discretion the 
officers were granted by the wording of the statute”). 
152 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (requiring a greater degree of specificity when “a statute’s literal scope 
. . . is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment”). 
 
Due Process Concerns arise with: 
                
    Vague laws 
 
    Overlapping ordinances 
 





judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, an ordinance must provide a person of 
ordinary intelligence notice of what conduct is prohibited, and the criminalized behavior must 
not be susceptible of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.153 Thus, an ordinance violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment if it fails to clearly define the prohibited conduct in a manner that 
would allow for relatively uniform, rather than arbitrary, enforcement.154  
 
 Anti-begging ordinances are susceptible to due process concerns. The laws target a 
particular form of speech; they deal with solicitation and panhandling specifically, as opposed 
to all speech generally. Perhaps an aggressive begging ordinance that targets all form of 
speech is, in fact, a law against harassment.  
 
Not surprisingly, courts have increasingly scrutinized anti-begging ordinances with 
great care in recent years, routinely striking those laws written with vague restrictions devoid 
of objective criteria.155 Without such judicial oversight, laws may allow for unfettered 
discretion and virtually unrestrained powers to arrest, which is offensive to constitutional 
freedoms.156  
 
 Discriminatory enforcement of marginalized groups is also evident in how individuals 
experiencing homelessness and the act of begging are often portrayed in the media. For 
example, a woman who panhandled to raise money for school supplies received praise from 
her community,157 while a man who panhandled for his basic needs was regarded with 
contempt and was perceived by others as a wrongdoer.158 These two contrasting stories 
illustrate the problem with discriminatory enforcement. Who is more likely to be cited for their 
behavior? The teacher panhandling for school supplies or the individual panhandling for his 
most basic of needs?  
 
                                                             
153 Webster, 802 P.2d at 1338. 
154 Id.  
155 Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 54 (explaining how “common reactions to visible poverty—discomfort, unease, 
disgust, and anxiety—fuel the urge to exile” people experiencing homelessness from public space). 
156 City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465–67 (1987) (“Although we appreciate the difficulties of drafting precise 
laws, we have repeatedly invalidated laws that provide the police with unfettered discretion to arrest individuals for 
words or conduct that annoy or offend them.”); see also Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 
(1992) (holding invalid laws delegating “overly broad discretion to the decision maker”). 
157 See, e.g., Katie Kindelan, Oklahoma Teacher Panhandles to Raise Money for School Supplies, ABC NEWS (July 25, 
2017), http://abcnews.go.com/Lifestyle/oklahoma-teacher-panhandles-raise-money-school-
supplies/story?id=48815271; Noe Hernandez, Panhandling Mom Raises §10K for Daughter’s College, Ends Tuition 
Quest to Return to Work, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-
now/2017/08/28/mom-begs-college-tuition/609384001/.  
158 See Mark Johnson, American Fork Places Barriers to Block Panhandlers, DAILY HERALD (May 8, 2013), 
http://www.heraldextra.com/news/local/north/american-fork/american-fork-places-barriers-to-block-
panhandlers/article_8348fdb4-3092-5e98-aaa3-f8006ca34f99.html; see also Steve DeVane, Council Members 
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Second, aggressive begging laws are often one of many overlapping ordinances with 
differing penalties that cause both due process and equal protection concerns.161 Overlapping 
ordinances criminalize the same behavior under two or more separate ordinances. When those 
ordinances carry different penalties, discriminatory enforcement against particular classes of 
individuals is inevitable.162 For example, aggressive begging ordinances may “hold homeless 
individuals to a higher standard than existing assault or harassment laws, which often prohibit 
the same conduct but are facially neutral.”163 Cities cannot deem one criminal activity worse 
simply because it is conducted combined with constitutionally protected—albeit disfavored—
speech.164 When aggressive begging ordinances and existing assault or harassment laws have 
different penalties, they may violate the right to due process; differing penalties for identical 
conduct may “authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”165  
                                                             
159 Kindelan, supra note 157. 
160 Dion Lefler, New Wichita Law: You Could go to Jail for Giving Money to a Roadside Panhandler, WHICHITA EAGLE 
(Dec. 12, 2018), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article189336969.html (writing that 
“panhandlers and drivers who give them money could face stiff fines or even jail time under an ordinance 
approved by the Wichita City Council”). 
161 Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 7 (stating that at least “66% of [Washington] cities draft criminalization 
ordinances in a way that either overlap with other ordinances or contain compound provisions that criminalize 
multiple, and often unrelated, behaviors”). See infra Part III, Section (D) for an example of overlapping ordinances 
in Washington. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 4, 17–28 (comparison of Seattle’s Pedestrian Interference ordinance and its Harassment ordinance reveals 
that aggressive begging “is nothing more than harassment in the context of a poor person asking for money”).  
164 McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 193 (2015). 
165 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999); Centro De La Comunidad Hispana De Locust Valley v. Town 
of Oyster Bay, 128 F. Supp. 3d 597, 618–19 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding no “comfort that the Town's safety officers will 
use their discretion, or be ‘trained’ on how to determine whether a person is soliciting employment or attempting 
to stop a vehicle to solicit employment” because “[s]uch discretion may surely invite discriminatory 





Third, due process concerns arise with aggressive begging laws specifically because of 
how those laws shift the focus of culpability.166 Often, such laws are written so culpability is 
based on the perception of the bystander rather than on the specific, objective conduct of the 
individual asking for help. As a result, an individual can violate aggressive begging laws without 
engaging in objectively aggressive behavior.167  For example, a person being asked to give 
money might feel “compelled or fearful” yet cannot point to any objective conduct that the 
speaker should have avoided. When culpability is based on the bystander’s perception, the 
focus shifts from the conduct of the beggar to the bystander’s feelings, which are filtered 
through the bystander’s own lens of prejudice and inherent bias.168 Thus, a person 
experiencing homelessness may have no way to inform his or her conduct to fit the law—
simply asking for help may be a crime. 
 
As a policy matter, these aggressive begging laws are 
not appropriate because they cater to implicit and 
unconscious biases regarding visible poverty. When little or 
no guidance is provided about the objective conduct 
prohibited, law enforcement is left to rely on subjective 
perceptions: “whether that perception is judged as a 
‘reasonable person’ feeling fearful or compelled or some 
perceived manifestation of an ‘intent to intimidate.’”170 In 
such circumstances, individuals exercising their 
constitutional right to ask for help in public have no way of knowing “how to conform 
themselves to the law” because there is no objective basis to determine when peaceful 
requests for money might be perceived as threatening or intimidating.171 
 
  
                                                             
166 See infra Part III, pp. 63–65 for a more in-depth discussion on how due process concerns arise when culpability 
is found in the subjective perception of the “victim.” 
167 See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(G) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “in a group of two or more 
persons”); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(H) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “within fifty feet of any other 
panhandler”). 
168 Telephone Interview with Aaron Burkhalter, Editor at Real Change (Oct. 6, 2017).  
169 See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(G) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “in a group of two or more 
persons”); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(H) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “within fifty feet of any other 
panhandler”). 
170 See Memorandum from Justin Olson to Professor Sara Rankin, Director of the Homeless Rights Advocacy 
Project at Seattle University School of Law, Washington’s Panhandling Ordinances: Graphical Representations 2 
(2017) [hereinafter Olson Memorandum] (reporting that 42% of the surveyed aggressive begging laws trigger 
liability based on perception alone, 54%, contain both a conduct component as well as a perception component, 
2% contain only conduct components, and 2% contain neither conduct nor perception based components). 
Notably, 98% of aggressive begging ordinances contain a perception-based component. Id. 
171 Wunsch, supra note 115. 
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A common example reveals how 
impractical and morally repugnant laws with a 
subjective component can be. Under most of 
these laws, it is enough to trigger criminal liability 
if a bystander feels fearful or compelled to 
donate. Yet in cities throughout Washington, both 
volunteers and paid organizations will place 
representatives at street corners asking for 
donations to one cause or another. Environmental 
activists, political fundraisers, and champions of charitable causes may not make passersby 
feel fearful, but they make bystanders feel compelled to give. Were these laws faithfully 
applied, the examples above would be liable under the aggressive begging ordinances. Yet it is 
not the clean-cut, college-aged activists at risk under these laws; it is the visibly poor who ask 
for help, not out activism but out of necessity. 
 
Recap of Applicable Law 
▪ A legal presumption exists that anti-begging laws are content-based 
laws.173 
▪ Permitting laws targeting solicitation specifically are content-based 
because they “target specific speech based on its communicative 
intent.”174 
▪ Content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny.175 
▪ Cities must show that the permitting law is the least restrictive means 
of achieving a compelling interest. 176 
▪ The law must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.177 
▪ A content-neutral law must leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.178  
▪ The city must supply meaningful evidence-based data to establish its 
compelling interest.179 
                                                             
172 City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Wash. 1990). 
173 See City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P.3d 1056, 1063–64 (2016). 
174 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395). 
175 McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 187 (2015). 
176 Id. (citing McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014)). 
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179 McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 187. 
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PART II: FEW SAFE HAVENS 
 
A. The Criminalization of Begging in Washington 
 
Throughout Washington State, an overwhelming majority of cities have adopted 
ordinances that curtail and criminalize the exercise of free speech in the form of begging. A 
survey of sixty-four cities throughout Washington State found 121 anti-begging ordinances,180 
indicating that cities continue to rely upon the criminal law as a response to disfavored speech 
from marginalized groups. This section summarizes key findings drawn from the data collected 
on those begging restrictions.  
 
The majority of cities surveyed (86%) had at least one ordinance restricting begging in 
some form.181 No clear pattern or common thread links the few cities that have no anti-
begging ordinances. The criminalization of begging is neither limited to one region over 
another nor to large cities over small cities. There are few safe havens throughout Washington 
and no way to predict whether a particular city will allow individuals to ask for help in public. 
The graph below depicts the number of cities with anti-begging ordinances in their municipal 
codes:182   
 
 
                                                             
180 The complete survey data, current as of April 2018, is on file with the Homeless Rights Advocacy Project (HRAP) 
at Seattle University School of Law [hereinafter Ordinance Chart].  
181 The survey revealed that 55 of the 64 cities surveyed had at least one anti-begging restriction within their 
municipal codes.  
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These ordinances restrict begging through many mechanisms.183 The data shows that 
ordinances with zone or geographic restrictions are the most common method of 
criminalization.184 The following graph depicts anti-begging ordinances in Washington State 
sorted into four categories of common restrictions: geographic restrictions, distance 




Beyond simply victimizing protected conduct, anti-begging ordinances also impose 
severe penalties for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. Proponents of homeless 
criminalization laws commonly argue that the penalties are mere infractions carrying civil 
(monetary) penalties—not criminal. These proponents claim no one ever faces the prospect of 
                                                             
183 Id. 
184 Id.  
185 Note that some cities have ordinances containing all four types of restrictions within one ordinance. For 
example, a city may have an ordinance that prohibits begging within public parks, and also on sidewalks between 
the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. This ordinance would be included in both the zone/geographic restriction 
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jail time for camping in public spaces, sitting on sidewalks, or—in the case of this present 
study—asking for help.186 But to the contrary, HRAP researchers discovered the opposite to be 
true: the majority of anti-begging ordinances provide for misdemeanor penalties.  
 
 The chart below demonstrates the dramatic discrepancy between civil penalties and 




Penalties for begging are severe: 83% of the surveyed begging ordinances are 
misdemeanors, which means violators may incur a substantial fine and possible 
incarceration.187 Moreover, the above chart does not account for ordinances with penalties 
that transform infractions into misdemeanors.188 Of the remaining 15% listed as infractions, 
half allow for a civil infraction to evolve into a misdemeanor—typically due to repeated 
violations.189 Under these “progressive penalty” provisions, repeat violations of the same 
conduct, such as asking for help again after receiving a negative response, may transform 
some of those relatively few civil infractions into misdemeanors. Interestingly, some 
misdemeanor ordinances themselves also contained progressive penalty provisions, providing 
for enhanced fines and jail time because of multiple citations.190  
                                                             
186 See Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37. 
187 See Ordinance Chart, supra note 180. 
188 See, e.g., Centralia MC § 10.37.060(A)–(C) (2014) (increasing penalties for multiple offenses: “Class 1 civil 
infraction with the maximum assessment not to exceed . . . two hundred fifty dollars” for first offense; “misdemeanor 
. . . subject to a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars . . . and/or imprisonment not to exceed ninety days” for 
second offense; and “gross misdemeanor” punishable by a fine “not to exceed five thousand dollars . . . and/or 
imprisonment not to exceed three hundred and sixty-five days” for third offense (emphasis added)). 
189 See Olson Memorandum, supra note 170, at 5.  
190 See, e.g., Port Angeles MC § 12.04.130 (2016) (first offense punishable “by a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment 
for up to thirty days, or both,” second offense punishable “by a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for up to 
ninety days, or both,” and third and subsequent offenses punishable “by a fine of up to $5,000 and imprisonment 








As depicted above, misdemeanor ordinances drastically outnumber infraction 
ordinances for every category of restrictions HRAP researchers identified. Specifically, 77% of 
violations of geographic restrictions result in a misdemeanor, while only 20% result in an 
infraction; 90% of violations of distance restrictions result in a misdemeanor, while only 3% 
result in an infraction; 75% of violations of time restrictions result in a misdemeanor, while 25% 
result in an infraction; and 94% of violations of manner restrictions result in a misdemeanor, 
while only 6% result in an infraction. This data is striking when considering that the most 
common ordinances are geographic restrictions, which operate to criminalize peaceful 
begging. This effectively means that cities are not only criminalizing constitutionally protected 
behavior, but they are severely punishing the exercise of the First Amendment right to ask for 
help. 
 
The data also reveals that begging laws have become increasingly popular throughout 
Washington over the last 40 to 50 years. This rise in popularity corresponds with an increase in 
homelessness in many cities.191 The increase also coincides with the general trend of 
criminalizing visible poverty through other means.192 The chart below depicts a timeline of new 




Begging restrictions were fairly minimal throughout the State until 1976–1980, at which 
time there was a sharp increase in the passage of new laws.193 This increase in anti-begging 
laws occurred at the same time as the nation suffered a decline in affordable housing and a 
                                                             
191 See Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37. See infra Appendix, Part II, for a side by side comparison of the rise in 
begging restrictions based on data collected for this research and the general trend of criminalization policies that 
was reported in Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37. 
192 Id.  






















reduction in spending for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).194 This 
increase also coincides with the deinstitutionalization of mental health treatment that made it 
difficult for individuals with severe mental illness to find care and shelter.195 These trends 
suggest that as poverty becomes more visible in public space—due to factors including 
divestments in affordable housing and mental health treatment—society responds to visible 
poverty by criminalizing poverty rather than restoring investments in non-punitive options.196 
 
Since 1996, Washington cities have been enacting anti-begging ordinances in greater 
numbers. By the 2006–2010 period, Washington cities passed more than triple the number of 
begging restrictions than they had during the 1991–1995 period, often enacting new 
ordinances in addition to preexisting ones. Specifically, in 1991–1995 period, Washington cities 
passed nine new ordinances, while in the 2006–2010 period, Washington cities passed twenty-
nine new ordinances.  
 
The drastic escalation during the 2006–2010 period coincides with the 2008 financial 













                                                             
194 A WRAP Primer on Transforming Rental Assistance, WESTERN REG’L ADVOCACY PROJECT, 
http://wraphome.org/wraparchives/downloads/A%20WRAP%20Primer%20on%20TRA.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 
2017). 
195 DANIEL YOHANNA, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES,  AM. 
MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS (Oct. 2013), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2013/10/mhst1-1310.html; The 
deinstitutionalization of mental health treatment was a policy decision and movement to remove individuals with 
severe mental illness out of large state institutions and then those institutions were subsequently closed. This 
deinstitutionalization was made without ensuring that the individuals received the care and rehabilitation 
necessary in order to live successfully within the community. E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING 
AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS Ch. 1-3 (1997).  
196 See Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37; Rankin 2016, supra note 8. 








A likely reason for the increase in begging restrictions is the recent upsurge of 
aggressive begging laws.198 During the 1990s, courts began to strike down outright 
prohibitions on peaceful begging as unconstitutional restrictions on free speech.199  
 
In response, many cities tried to circumvent such constitutional restrictions by 
incorporating non-aggressive conduct into their aggressive begging laws: for example, 
begging with a partner, even if sitting down and saying nothing but only holding a sign, could 
constitute aggressive begging.200 The graph below depicts the rise in aggressive begging laws 




This graph shows a major increase in aggressive begging laws beginning in 2005, when 
four new laws were enacted in 2005 alone, leading to 2014, when six new laws were enacted.201 
In fact, 52% of all existing aggressive begging laws surveyed were enacted after 2005.202 This 
                                                             
198 Sena, supra note 89, at 293. 
199 See, e.g., Loper v. New York City Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1993); Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 679 
N.E.2d 184, 190 (1997). 
200 Wunsch, supra note 115. 


















1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015
Date of Enactments of  Aggressive Begging Laws




trend suggests that cities are attempting to circumvent judicial scrutiny by enacting aggressive 
begging laws under the veil of targeting aggressive behavior rather than protected speech. 
 
The graph below shows that the potential to criminalize even peaceful requests for 
donations is rampant throughout Washington: the vast majority of aggressive begging laws 
include a subjective, perception-based component as part or all of the basis for determining 
when begging is unlawful. Over half of all such ordinances contain both a conduct component 
and a perception component, providing even more ways to find guilt under the law. Notably, 
only 2% of all aggressive begging ordinances are defined only by the specific, objective 




As explained in Part I, Section B, the rise of aggressive begging restrictions raises 
substantial constitutional and policy concerns. Homeless criminalization ordinances are 
ineffective. They do not reduce homelessness or curtail offenders from engaging in necessary, 
life-sustaining behavior;203 they cost more than many non-punitive alternatives;204 they 
indirectly discriminate against distinct marginalized groups;205 and they harken back to past 
eras when the law was used to banish undesirable groups from public space.206 But the data 
                                                             
203 See NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2 at 36. 
204 See Howard & Tran, supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
205 See Kaya Lurie & Breanne Schuster, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, DISCRIMINATION AT 
THE MARGINS: THE INTERSECTIONALITY OF HOMELESSNESS AND OTHER MARGINALIZED GROUPS 2–5 (Sara Rankin ed. 2015) 
(revealing how “racial minorities are disproportionately represented in the homeless population”).  
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reveals that Washington municipalities have continued to implement punitive measures to 
remove evidence of visible poverty from their cities. 
 
B. Enforcement of Begging Restrictions in Washington 
 
Obtaining data on the enforcement of begging restrictions in Washington’s cities 
proved difficult. Although HRAP requested public records from eleven Washington cities,207 
only two cities—Marysville and Lakewood—had formally cited individuals for violating specific 
begging laws in the past five years.208 Nine of the eleven cities stated that no individuals were 
cited under any of the ordinances between January 1, 2013, and January 1, 2018.209  
 
2013-2017 Citations for Violating Begging Restrictions: Cities with Zero Citations210 
City Ordinance(s) Citations  
Arlington 9.56.50 Coercive Solicitation 0 
Bonney Lake 9.11.050 Aggressive Solicitation 0 
Centralia 10.37.030 Coercive Solicitation 0 
Des Moines 19.08.030(7) Regulations & Prohibited Activities: Public Parks 0 
Lake Stevens 9.08.030 Aggressive Begging 0 
Issaquah 9.45.030 Coercive Solicitation 
9.45.040 Time of Solicitation 
0 
Mount Vernon 9.21.060 Aggressive Begging 0 
Tacoma 8.13A.040 Solicitation by Coercion 0 
Puyallup 9A.08.040 Solicitation by Coercion 0 
 
At first glance, the lack of reported citations might seem like a reason for free speech 
advocates to celebrate. However, any enforcement data (or lack thereof) must be understood 
                                                             
207 Those cities are: Arlington, Bonney Lake, Centralia, Des Moines, Lakewood, Lake Stevens, Issaquah, 
Marysville, Mount Vernon, Tacoma, and Puyallup. Requests for records were submitted pursuant to Washington’s 
Public Records Act, RCW §42.56 et seq., on January 29, 2018 and January 30, 2018.  
208 The process of requesting public records from the city of Lakewood was especially challenging. Specifically, the 
city of Lakewood maintains paper files of its criminal records. Email from Erika Sullivan, Paralegal, City of 
Lakewood, to author (Feb. 21, 2018 14:40 PST) (on file with author). Because Lakewood’s records are paper files, 
the city stated that it would take over a year to search for the responsive records requested on the enforcement of 
Lakewood’s anti-begging ordinances. Email from Erika Sullivan, Paralegal, City of Lakewood, to author (Feb. 2, 
2018 13:17 PST) (on file with author). HRAP reduced the scope of the request for data on two separate occasions 
before receiving a timely response. The difficulty in obtaining data regarding the enforcement of a city’s 
ordinances illustrates the importance of effective and efficient administrative procedures and policies. 
209 Those cities include: Arlington, Bonney Lake, Centralia, Des Moines, Lake Stevens, Issaquah, Mount Vernon, 
Tacoma, and Puyallup. 





in the context of informal enforcement methods, such as “move-along” orders and referrals to 
“Designated Mental Health Professionals” for involuntary commitment.211 As explained below, 
such orders are increasingly popular means of displacing visibly poor people from public view:  
they achieve the same prized outcome of displacement without leaving evidence of 
enforcement.   
 
1. The Problem of Move-Along Orders 
 
Police officers routinely order people experiencing 
homelessness to move from public space as a method of 
enforcing laws that criminalize homelessness.212 Move-
along orders are given when officers approach individuals 
telling them, in sum or substance, “You have to move,” and 
“You can’t be here.”213 When individuals refuse to comply 
with a move-along order, police officers threaten to issue 
an arrest.214 Such an arrest might be combined with a civil 
penalty, removal to a psychiatric hospital, or the 
destruction of the individual’s property.215 These move-along orders are just one of many 
pervasive penalties associated with the overarching criminalization of homelessness in 
Washington.216 They effectively extinguish and chill the dissemination of speech just as formal 
arrests and citations do. However, individuals cannot challenge the orders without risking 
arrest or issuance of civil citations. Due to the very nature of these move-along orders, they are 
vulnerable to discriminatory use by police enforcement because the issuance of move-along 
orders is not tracked by law enforcement within Washington.217 
 
Move-along orders are prevalent across the country. For example, in New York, officials 
have long been proponents of the “broken windows” theory, wherein the appearance of 
disorder (or, in the minds of some city officials, the appearance of poverty) invites criminal 
                                                             
211 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05. 
212 Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, “Forced into Breaking the Law”: The Criminalization of 
Homelessness in Connecticut, YALE L. SCH. (Nov. 2016), 
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/news/criminalization_of_homelessness_report_for_web_full_re
port.pdf.  
213 Complaint at 1, Picture the Homeless, Inc. v. New York City Police Department, No. M-I-J-16-1034067 (filed with 
City of New York Comm’n Human Rights May 31, 2016) [hereinafter Picture the Homeless Complaint], 
http://picturethehomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Revised-Verified-Complaint-to-NYC-Commn-on-
Human-Rights-filed-2016-05-31-00049320.pdf.  
214 Id.  
215 Id.  
216 Christopher Herring, Dilara Yarbrough & Lisa Marie Alatorre, Pervasive Penalty: How the Criminalization of 
Homelessness Perpetuates Poverty (forthcoming 2018).  
217 See email from Mark Solomon, Community Crime Prevention Specialist, Seattle Police Dep’t, to author (Apr. 
20, 2018, 11:00 PST) (on file with author) (“It would be hard to get an accurate number of ‘move along’ [orders] 
because we don’t formally track these types of contacts.”). 
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behavior.218 But over a period of approximately twelve years, individuals were arrested only six 
times under New York’s anti-begging law.219 In Loper v. New York, it was conceded that while 
very few arrests were made under the anti-begging law, “officers used the statute as an 
authority to order individuals whom were begging to ‘move on.’”220 The Second Circuit held 
that panhandling was protected speech entitled to the highest First Amendment protection.221 
Yet even today, the city of New York still uses the practice of move-along orders to force 
individuals experiencing homelessness to disappear from sight.222  
 
Although move along orders are invisible because they are not recorded or reported in 
many jurisdictions, existing data suggests they are a prevalent means of moving people 
experiencing homelessness.  In 2014, a survey of 351 individuals experiencing homelessness in 
San Francisco found that 70% of individuals had been forced to move from public space by law 
enforcement.223 Of those who wore ordered to move, only 9% moved to location indoors while 
the remaining 91% reported that they remained in public spaces and simply moved to a new 
outdoor location.224 Most individuals forced to move simply went “down the street, around the 
corner, or to walk around and returned after the police left.”225 Further illustrating the 
prevalence of move-along orders, over 5000 individuals received move-along orders from 
police in Denver, Colorado in 2016.226  
 
Move-along orders are also a common practice throughout cities in Washington State. 
Due to the informal nature of move-along orders, this type of enforcement is not tracked by 
Washington law enforcement or by cities.227  Still, as explained below, this virtually invisible 
practice is common, pervasive, and potent. 
                                                             
218 See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam et al., How a Theory of Crime and Policing was Born, and Went Terribly Wrong, NPR 
(Nov. 1, 2016, 12:00AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/01/500104506/broken-windows-policing-and-the-origins-
of-stop-and-frisk-and-how-it-went-wrong (“Rudy Giuliani won election in 1993, promising to reduce crime and 
clean up the streets. Very quickly, he adopted broken windows as his mantra.”). 
219 Fay Leoussis, The New Constitutional Right to Beg—Is Begging Really Protected Speech?, 14 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 
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Move along orders are potent because the recipient has no recourse, no reasonable due 
process of law to protect their rights. The recipient has no opportunity to challenge the 
lawfulness of the underlying ordinance supporting the move-along instruction, nor is there any 
real choice for the individual to make when ordered to move by law enforcement.  Individuals 
experiencing homelessness are simply told to leave the public space at once or face the full 
weight of the law. For example, in Seattle, police officers aim for “voluntary compliance” of the 
city’s sit-lie ordinance and will issue informal move-along orders as the primary means of 
enforcement.228 If an individual is sleeping in a doorway or lying on the street, officers will tell 
them they need to get up and go.229 This practice is common throughout all of Washington.230  
 
Further, the city of Centralia purposefully used 
only warnings to enforce an ordinance that restricted 
begging at most intersections within the town.232 That 
specific ordinance has since been amended.233 But the 
current version of the ordinance explicitly states that 
the penalty for a first violation of coercive solicitation is 
a verbal notification and warning.234  Centralia’s city 
attorney, Shannon Murphy-Olson, stated that the 
verbal warning change would “be beneficial because it 
will not immediately impose monetary fines on people who do not have a source of income.”235  
While “a ‘move along’ order may sound benign, it is enormously disruptive and harmful for 
people who live on the street and do not have homes where they can seek respite from police 
attention.”236 Move-along orders circumvent the voluminous repercussions associated with 
criminal and civil penalties, yet they are no less offensive to civil liberty where an individual is 
politely but unequivocally banished from the public eye. 
 
Individuals experiencing homeless who spend time in public spaces, such as those 
individuals who engage in begging or who rest along public sidewalks are easy targets for 
move-along orders.237 Because of the insidious, disruptive, and harassing nature of these 
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orders, they are a "pervasive penalty" associated with the overarching criminalization of 
homelessness in Washington State and throughout the country.238 Pervasive penalties are a 
“punitive process of policing through move-along orders, citations, and threats of arrest that 
largely remain hidden from public view and official scrutiny because such enforcement falls 
short of official booking.”239 As noted above, move-along orders do not trigger the regular 
recordkeeping process of enforcement required under the law.240 “Official citation and arrest 
numbers gloss over the thousands of instances in which officers detain, interrogate, search, 
and make demands of inhabitants without activating the formal criminal justice process.”241 
The public should be especially wary of those police enforcement actions, which evade 
oversight. 
 
The personal experiences of individuals on 
the receiving end of move-along orders reveal the 
harmful nature of informal enforcement 
mechanisms. Individuals have described them as “a 
constant pestering that keeps you from ever 
feeling relaxed or belonging just about 
anywhere.”243 Move-along orders also implicitly 
encourage individuals to avoid the police, even 
when facing danger.244 For example, one individual 
avoided calling the police to report being assaulted, asking, “What’s the point? If I called them, 
they would have made us all move.”245 These move-along orders have been identified as 
having lasting collateral consequences. Specifically, they push people to unsafe spaces, lead to 
adverse health effects, and effectively move individuals away from necessary resources.246  
 
Move-along orders find their roots in what has been officially coined the “broken 
windows” theory of criminality, which has also been used to support anti-begging ordinances. 
The theory uses the phrase “broken windows” as a metaphor for disorderly conduct—an image 
of a street with buildings in disrepair, garbage strewn about, and general chaos and 
lawlessness everywhere.247 Disorderly conduct has been defined as “incivility, boorish, and 
threatening behavior that disturbs life, especially urban life.”248 The broken windows theory 
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does not try to hide disdain for visible poverty. Rather, the theory itself clarifies that certain 
individuals are the benefactors of a lawful orderly society, while certain other individuals 
should be the subject of heavy policing and strict control.249  
 
The citizen who fears . . . the importuning beggar is not merely 
expressing his distaste for unseemly behavior; he is also giving voice to 
a bit of folk wisdom that happens to be a correct generalization—
namely, that serious crime flourishes in areas where disorderly behavior 
goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first 
broken window. . . . If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome 
panhandler from annoying the passers-by, the thief may reason, it is 
even less likely to call the police to identify a potentially mugger or to 
interfere if a mugging takes place.250 
 
The broken windows theory asserts that the “more people there are who are harming 
no identifiable person but merely engaging in what the authors declare to be ‘disorderly 
behavior,’ the more just is the engagement in an unjust act, for ‘disorderly behavior’ in and of 
itself poses a ‘grave threat . . . to our society.’”251  The theory expressly encourages police to 
“push the homeless along” and out of public spaces.252 Essentially, the theory is a “policy of 
‘zero tolerance’ for behaviors and actions deemed disorderly or ‘worrisome’”—behaviors 
which, to a proponent of the theory, undeniably include conduct associated with 
homelessness.253 
 
Move-along orders are the primary method officers use to enforce anti-begging 
ordinances.254 However, in the context of begging, an individual’s First Amendment rights are 
infringed upon when a police officer tells them to move-along. In Colten v. Kentucky, the 
Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals that found an individual 
guilty of disorderly conduct when a police officer asked the defendant to leave the scene, 
rejecting the defendant’s counter claim that his First Amendment rights were infringed 
upon.255 Specifically, the Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that the defendant “‘was not 
undertaking to exercise any constitutionally protected freedom.’ Rather, he ‘appears to have 
had no purpose other than to cause inconvenience and annoyance. So the statute as applied 
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here did not chill or stifle the exercise of any constitutional right.’”256 Scholars have interpreted 
Colten to mean that “a person who congregates with others with no bona fide intention to 
exercise a constitutional right . . . can be asked to move along.”257  
 
But courts have routinely rejected enforcement policies that threaten to chill or 
otherwise infringe upon the exercise of constitutionally protected speech:  
 
When a police officer tells an individual to “move along,” the request 
comes with an implicit threat that if the person does not leave the area, 
he or she will be given a citation or arrested. Although citations are used 
only for infractions for which punishment does not include the possibility 
of jail time, a person’s failure to pay or plead to a citation can result in a 
warrant for arrest. Thus, although being asked to move along may not 
seem to criminalize behavior, it is part and parcel of a system that 
threatens eventual arrest for prohibited conduct.258 
 
 
         Ultimately, the data—or lack of data—from Washington cities regarding enforcement of 
anti-begging ordinances leads to only one of two possible conclusions: either these ordinances 
are being enforced through informal means or they are wholly unnecessary. Because 
Washington’s cities have no mechanism for keeping track of move-along orders, there is no 
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way to understand the full extent to which these orders are given and how residents’ lives are 
being affected.  
 
But the generalized research on warnings and move-along orders establish that when 
they used to prevent someone from peacefully begging, they are unconstitutional and have a 
chilling effect on protected speech. Much like the futility of issuing civil penalties to those least 
able to pay them, issuing move-along orders to people experiencing homelessness merely 
compounds the suffering of our vulnerable neighbors. 
 
2. Enforcement Data Retrieved from Lakewood and Marysville 
 
Like all cities, move-along warnings likely buoy most enforcement efforts.  But 
Marysville and Lakewood also formally cited individuals for violating specific begging laws in 
the past five years. The table below illustrates the number of citations given from January 1, 
2013 to January 1, 2018. This citation data fails to capture the full extent of enforcement of 
anti-begging laws in Lakewood and Marysville since move-along warnings, due to their very 
nature, are pervasive penalties that escape the paper trail of official booking.  
 
2013-2017 Citations in Lakewood & Marysville 
City Ordinances Total Citations  
Lakewood 8.76.510: Solicitation 
9A.05.050: Unlawful Solicitation 
9A.04.020A: Restricted Areas 
9A.04.010: Aggressive Begging 
51 citations 
issued 
Marysville 6.37.040: Coercive Solicitation 
6.37.030: Aggressive Begging 
6.37.047: Place of Solicitation 
4 citations issued 
 
Over a five-year period, Marysville issued only four citations. Lakewood issued fifty-one 
citations.  Marysville's citations include two citations for Aggressive Begging, one citation for 
Coercive Solicitation, and one citation for Place of Solicitation. Curiously, in April 2018, the 
Marysville City Council amended the city's municipal code to eliminate “conflicting 
provisions.”259  Prior to April 2018, section 6.37.030 of Marysville’s Municipal Code was titled 
Pedestrian Interference, prohibiting intentionally obstructing pedestrian traffic or aggressively 
begging.260 Marysville amended that ordinance in 2018 under the new title Aggressive Begging. 
The amended ordinance prohibits aggressively begging only.261 The City Council removed the 
                                                             








obstructing pedestrian traffic provision because that conduct was already “covered by other 
provisions in the code.”262  
 
Still, Marysville’s Aggressive Begging ordinance now appears to directly overlap with its 
Coercive Solicitation Ordinance. The overlapping ordinances prohibit effectively the same 
behavior.  
 
Marysville Overlapping Ordinances 
§ 6.37.030 Aggressive Begging263 § 6.37.040 Coercive Solicitation264 
“It is unlawful to aggressively beg.” “It is unlawful for a person to make coercive 
solicitation.” 
““Aggressively beg’ means to beg with the 
intent to intimidate or coerce another 
person…”265 
 
“‘Beg’ means to ask for money or goods as 
a charity.”266 
“‘Solicitation…is any means of asking, 
begging…directed to another person, 
requesting an immediate donation of  
money…”267 
 
Marysville’s two ordinances contain very similar language. Marysville’s municipal code 
defines “coerce” and “coercive” as (1) approaching, speaking, or gesturing to a person in a way 
that would cause a reasonable person to believe they were being threatened with a crime; (2) 
approaching within one foot of a person for the purpose of making a solicitation without first 
obtaining the person’s consent; (3) persisting in soliciting after being given a negative 
response; (4) blocking the passage of a person; (5) engaging in conduct that “would reasonably 
be construed as intended to compel or force a person being solicited to accede to demands"; or 
making false or misleading representations while soliciting.268 Both Marysville’s aggressive 
begging ordinance and coercive solicitation ordinance include the word “coerce” or “coercive” 
in their language, effectively prohibiting the exact same behavior but with two overlapping 
ordinances. 
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Marysville’s overlapping ordinances 
present due process issues. Marysville cited one 
individual in 2016 for coercive solicitation and 
two individuals in 2017 for aggressive begging.269  
When these two ordinances prohibit the same 
behavior, how does an enforcing officer know 
which ordinance to cite one under? What was 
the determinative factor that the officer used in deciding which ordinance to apply? According 
to Marysville's data, of those three charges, only one individual was found guilty of aggressive 
begging. The coercive solicitation citation was dismissed, and the other aggressive begging 
citation was “amended.” The individual found guilty of aggressive begging was convicted of a 
misdemeanor, which will carry severe collateral consequences for him.270 
 
Lakewood was the only other city that reported citations. Lakewood issued fifty-one 
citations for the five-year period from January 1, 2013, to January 1, 2017. This rate reflects a 
higher degree of enforcement when compared to the other cities surveyed. Of those citations 
issued, eleven citations were for Aggressive Begging under section 9A.04.010 of Lakewood’s 
Municipal Code, and forty were for begging in a Restricted Area under section 9A.04.020A. 
Zero citations were issued for sections 8.76.510 Solicitation and 9A.05.050 Unlawful 
Solicitation. Lakewood issued no citations in 2017.  
 
Lakewood's lack of formal enforcement after 2016 suggests the impact of the 
Washington Supreme Court decision in City of Lakewood v. Willis, which held provisions of 
Lakewood’s Restricted Areas ordinance unconstitutional.271  Still, the decline in formal citations 
does not mean Lakewood is no longer enforcing these begging restrictions. As previously 
explained, police commonly use the invisible enforcement mechanism of move-along orders to 
achieve the same outcome. 
 
 The graph below depicts the total number of anti-begging citations Lakewood issued 
between 2013 and 2017 and the number of citations issued for each ordinance. The data shows 
a spike in the number of citations issued in 2014. Lakewood issued twenty-five citations in 2014 
alone, accounting for nearly half of all citations issued throughout the four-year period.  
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This data may suggest that, as poverty became more visible in 2014, the city responded 
with greater enforcement of its begging restrictions. Pierce County, where Lakewood is 
located, had the highest number of unhoused individuals in 2014, totaling 1474 individuals.272  
In 2013, the county had 1303 unhoused individuals,273 and in 2015, 1283 individuals were 
considered unhoused.274  So 2014 represented a spike in Pierce County's homeless population 
and in Lakewood's enforcement of its begging restrictions. 
 
 Prior to 2017, Lakewood's enforcement focused primarily on begging in "restricted 
areas." As illustrated below, citations for begging in restricted areas account for 78% of the 
issued citations throughout the four-year period, while aggressive begging citations account 
for 22% of the issued citations: 
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 Notably, it was such a "restricted area" anti-begging ordinance that the Washington 
State Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in 2016. Lakewood's data does not indicate 
which provisions of the ordinance applied to citations under during its four-year time period; 
yet it is quite possible that some people cited under this ordinance were engaged in the very 
same conduct that the Court held to be constitutionally protected in Willis.  
 
Another key finding from Lakewood's data is that most anti-begging citations were 
dismissed. Specifically, eighteen of the citations were dismissed without prejudice and sixteen 
were dismissed with prejudice. When a case is dismissed with prejudice, the city is barred from 
raising the issue again in another lawsuit.275 When a case is dismissed without prejudice, the 
city can bring another lawsuit against the individual based on the same incident.276 While the 
dismissal of these citations ultimately means those individuals will not incur criminal record for 
the alleged violation, the experience of being cited or arrested for engaging in constitutionally 
protected behavior is still traumatic and carries serious collateral consequences.  
 
Fifteen of Lakewood's fifty-one citations resulted in a finding of guilt. Two of the 
citations were categorized as “Guilty Other Deferral Revoked,” which Lakewood explained 
“refers to revoked status or violation of a previous deferral or stipulated order of 
continuance.”277 For the two citations labeled “guilty other deferral revoked,” the individual 
was found guilty after violating a previous agreement to defer any sentencing or decision on 
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the merits of the case.278 It is unclear whether those previous agreements also involved the 
curtailment of any First Amendment rights. The graph below displays the variations in ultimate 
disposition of each citation: 
 
 
 While guilty sentences were relatively few, the penalties for those few defendants were 
disturbingly severe.  Both Lakewood’s aggressive begging ordinance and its restricted area 
ordinance results in a misdemeanor if violated.279 The penalties ranged from ninety-day jail 
sentences, with portions of those sentences suspended, and fines ranging from $0 to  
$500. The table below depicts the penalties for the five individuals found guilty aggressive 
begging in Lakewood: 
 
 
In contrast, the following table describes the penalties for the ten citations issued to 
individuals found guilty of begging in restricted areas in Lakewood: 
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Dismissed Without Prejudice: 
35%
Dismissed With Prejudice: 31%
Guilty: 30%
Guilty Other Deferral Revoked: 4%
Ultimate Charge
Aggressive Begging-Penalties 
 Year Sex Race Jail Sentence Fine 
Defendant 1 2013 Male White 90 days suspended $0 
Defendant 2 2014 Female White 90 days suspended $0 
Defendant 4 2014 Female White 90 days, 89 suspended $300 
Defendant 3 2014 Male Black 90 days, 88 suspended $500 





Interestingly, in Lakewood, begging in restricted areas appears to be penalized more 
severely than aggressive begging. The average jail time served for aggressive begging was 1.2 
days, with a range from one to three days served and the rest of the sentence suspended. In 
contrast, the average time served for violations of begging in restricted areas was four days, 
with a range from two to ten days served. An individual found guilty of aggressive begging was 
40% likely to receive a fine ranging from $300-$500; however, an individual found guilty of 
begging in a restricted area was 60% likely to receive a fine ranging from $300-$500. Notably, 
an individual found guilty of begging in a restricted area had a 50% chance of receiving a $500 
fine.  
 
Demographically, men are 75% more likely to 
be cited for violating anti-begging ordinances than 
women in Lakewood. Specifically, thirty-eight of the 
citations were issued to males, while thirteen were 
issued to females. Interestingly, in 2017, 39% of 
unhoused individuals counted in Pierce County 
identified as female and 57% identified as male.280 If 
Pierce County’s demographics represent the unhoused population in Lakewood,281 this data 
suggests that men are disproportionately cited for violating anti-begging restrictions. 
Specifically, males account for 18% more of the unhoused population than do females, but 
men are 75% more likely to be cited for violating Lakewood’s anti-begging ordinances.  
 
In fact, the data reveals that one white male282 in particular received numerous 
citations—eleven in total—accounting for 22% of all citations issued in Lakewood (ten citations 
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Begging in Restricted Areas- Penalties 
 Year Sex Race Jail Sentence Fine 
Defendant 1 2013 Male White 90 days suspended $0 
Defendant 2 2014 Male White 90 days, 85 suspended $500 
Defendant 3 2014 Male White 90 days, 88 suspended $500 
Defendant 4 2014 Male White 90 days, 80 suspended $500 
Defendant 5 2014 Female White 90 days, 80 suspended $0 
Defendant 6 2014 Female White 90 days, 80 suspended $500 
Defendant 7 2014 Male White 90 days suspended $500 
Defendant 8 2014 Female White 90 days suspended $0 
Defendant 9 2014 Male White 90 days suspended $0 
Defendant 10 2015 Male White 90 days, 87 suspended $300 
Men are 75% more likely to be 
cited for violating anti-begging 





for begging in restricted areas, and one for aggressive begging). He was cited twice in 2013, six 
times in 2014, and three times in 2015. Out of these citations, he was found guilty of begging in 
restricted areas five times (the aggressive begging citation was dismissed without prejudice), 
and the other begging in restricted areas citations were dismissed. The penalties for his 
citations were markedly severe: he was charged $1500 in fines (three separate $500 fines) and 
was sentenced to 90 days jail for each citation, totaling a cumulative of 450 days. He served 
twenty-five days in jail, receiving suspended sentences on the rest. This individual now has a 
lengthy criminal record for exercising his First Amendment right to ask for help.283  Because 
these are criminal charges, the impact of his record will follow him throughout his life.  
 
Lakewood's data suggests the danger of using anti-begging ordinances to respond to 
visible poverty. Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in 2016, Lakewood aggressively enforced 
its ordinances to deter and punish the free exercise of speech. Violators pay a heavy price for 
their refusal to be silenced. Many other cities throughout Washington may have taken—or are 
taking—the same stance. But Lakewood demonstrates the futility of punishing peaceful 
begging and its costly impact on both the City and its residents. 
 
 
PART III: BE SILENT: WASHINGTON’S RESTRICTIONS ON BEGGING 
 
Cities demonstrate considerable 
creativity in finding ways to restrict begging, 
but their efforts generally fall within these four 
categories: (1) restrictions on who can beg 
through permitting requirements; (2) 
prohibitions on when individuals can beg 
through time restrictions; (3) prohibitions on 
where individuals can beg through distance 
and place restrictions; and (4) prohibitions on how individuals can beg through aggressive 
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A. Restrictions on Who Can Beg: Permitting Requirements 
 
It has long been held that streets and parks are traditional public fora, 
appropriately used for the purposes of peaceful assembly,  
whereupon public discourse and the exchange of ideas may take place.286  
 
Permitting requirements are the most common method of restricting who may solicit, 
whether they do so for organized causes or for individual charity. Nearly one-third of surveyed 
Washington cities have enacted laws prohibiting begging without a permit either in public 
parks287 or throughout the entire city.288 Obtaining a permit can be difficult, if not impossible, 
for someone experiencing homelessness as it usually involves a complex administrative 
process. This process often requires the applicant to provide an address, telephone number, 
other personal information, and a monetary fee that an individual experiencing homelessness 
might not be able to afford.289 
 
Functionally, permitting requirements can constitute a de facto prohibition on begging. 
At the least, these restrictions have the potential to chill constitutionally protected speech by 
punishing individuals for failing to plan ahead by obtaining a permit prior to exercising their 
First Amendment right to ask for help. Some cities allow individuals caught while begging 
without a permit to face a combination of criminal, civil, and injunctive punishments for the 
same violation.290 Due to their potential to chill constitutionally protected speech, permitting 
laws have been successfully challenged in court.291 Preventing individuals from engaging in 
protected speech creates a prior restraint, and there is a strong presumption against the 
constitutionality of any such restraint.292 As shown in the following examples, the permitting 
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1. Citywide Permitting Requirements: Lakewood 
 
The city of Lakewood criminalizes begging through several ordinances, one of which 
requires solicitors to register with the city’s finance department ten days prior to soliciting 
within the city.293 The ordinance defines “solicitation” as a “request for contribution, 
including . . . any appeal . . . made for a charitable purpose.”294  Further, the ordinance exempts 
“[a]ny organizations which are…operated principally for charitable purposes, other than the 
raising of funds, when the solicitation of contributions is confined to the bona fide membership 
of the organization….”295 This law appears to apply to panhandling as it includes any person 
“having or purporting to have a charitable nature and [who] solicits and collects contributions 
for any charitable purpose.”296 Those registering must provide their contact information, 
purpose of solicitation, and dates of solicitation.297 They also must pay a $10 permit fee.298 As 
expected, soliciting without registering is prohibited.299  
 
Notably, all individuals soliciting must “provide personal identification of himself or 
herself upon demand by any law enforcement officer, and, upon demand, provide and exhibit a 
solicitor’s permit” from the city.300 In effect, this provision allows Lakewood police officers to 
interrupt and briefly seize any panhandler to demand to see their identification and permit. 
However, losing and replacing identification is a common struggle for people experiencing 
homelessness.301 Any violation of these permitting ordinances results in a misdemeanor.302 
 
Lakewood’s registration requirement is subject to a constitutional challenge because it 
targets a protected speech activity (charitable solicitation) for additional regulation not faced 
                                                             
293 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.030 (2010). Further, the registration is only valid for 90 days.  
294 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.010(D) (2010) (emphasis added). The statute further defines solicitation to also include 
“the solicitor’s offer or attempt to sell any . . . thing in connection with which: (1) any appeal is made for a 
charitable purpose; or (2) the name of any charitable purpose is used as an inducement for consummating the 
sale.”  
295 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.020 (2010). 
296 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.010(A) (2010). 
297 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.030 (2010). 
298 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.040 (2010). 
299 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050(A) (2010). 
300 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.060 (2010). 
301 Teresa Wiltz, Without ID, Homeless Trapped in Vicious Cycle, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 15, 2017), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/05/15/without-id-homeless-trapped-in-
vicious-cycle. Irreparable harm results from city-sanctioned encampment sweeps, including “harm to homeless 
people's security and dignity.” For example, people experiencing homelessness “lose medicine and health 
supplies; tents and bedding that shelter them from the elements; clothing and hygiene supplies; identification 
documents and other personal papers; the tools by which they try to make a meager income; and items of 
immeasurable sentimental value.” Without important identification documents, medication, clothing, and 
hygiene supplies, people experiencing homelessness are further hindered from finding and maintaining adequate 
employment. Kincaid v. City of Fresno, No. 106CV-1445, 2006 WL 3542732, at *40 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2006). 





by other speakers.303 A law enforcement officer would not know whether they have authority 
to stop a speaker and ask to see a permit without first examining the content of the speech to 
determine if it is a “charitable solicitation.”304  Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court found 
another Lakewood ordinance content-based because it did “not prohibit solicitation generally 
(it allows, for example, the solicitation of votes or customers), but only solicitation with the 
particular purpose: obtaining ‘money or goods as charity.’”305  Because Lakewood’s ordinance 
is content-based, it is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.306 Upon judicial review, Lakewood 
would have to show that the permitting laws are the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling state interest.307  
 
Whether Lakewood’s ordinance would survive judicial scrutiny depends on the 
compelling interest that motivated the statute. Although not required, the ordinance contains 
no statement of purpose or any compelling government motive behind the registration 
requirement. If the compelling interest behind Lakewood’s statute is the success of its business 
or tourism industry, courts have previously rejected such an interest, and the statute would fail 
to survive strict scrutiny.308 If the compelling interest behind Lakewood’s statute is public 
health or public safety, the city must present meaningful evidence-based data that the law is 
narrowly tailored to meet that interest.309  
 
However, the ordinance is unlikely to 
survive this heightened scrutiny because it 
criminalizes all charitable solicitation without 
connection to harmful conduct. The statute is 
a broad-based, rather than a narrowly 
tailored, prohibition on charitable solicitation. 
The registration requirements do not give 
panhandlers a chance to communicate their message without first registering with the city, 
and therefore, the law is more restrictive than necessary.310 Lakewood’s law effectively 
criminalizes the act of asking for help absent registration with the city.311 It is difficult to see 
how prohibiting all begging without a permit is “narrowly drawn” to achieve a “compelling 
state interest,” as this method of regulating begging fails to differentiate between peaceful 
                                                             
303 Under Lakewood MC § 9A.05.020, organizations “which are organized and operated principally for charitable 
purposes, other than raising funds, when the solicitation of contributions is confined to the bona fide membership 
of the organization and when the solicitation is managed and conducted solely by officers and members of such 
organizations who are unpaid for services” are exempt from these registration requirements. 
304 McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 186 (citing McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014)). 
305 Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016). 
306 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015). 
307 Id. 
308 See, e.g., McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 189. 
309 Id. at 187. 
310 See id. at 177 (finding that a statute allowing panhandlers only one chance to convey their message, “without 
following or following-up, is more restrictive than necessary”). 
311 Telephone Interview Jason McGill, YouthCare Engagement Manager (Oct. 10, 2017).  
 
Lakewood’s ordinance is unlikely to 
survive judicial scrutiny because it 
criminalizes all charitable 





begging representing an individual’s exercise of free speech in a classic public forum and 
begging that is truly in the government’s interest to prevent.312 By any measure, Lakewood’s 
registration requirement is likely unconstitutional. 
    
Setting aside the legal infirmities, Lakewood’s ordinance poses significant practical 
barriers to people experiencing homelessness. The permitting process is not suited to 
applicants needing to solicit immediate donations, and the application requirements such as 
providing an address, phone number, and application fee may not be feasible for homeless 
individuals.313 In addition, the limited nature of many cities’ permits (e.g., valid for 90 days)314 
means an individual would endure a reoccurring administrative grind just to ask for the help 
they need. 
 
2. Permitting Requirements in Public “Parks” 
 
Many Washington cities prohibit all begging within public parks without a permit or 
similar authorization from the city.315 The definition of “park,” when it is explicitly defined, 
commonly includes “all public parks” but also includes other public areas of the city that are 
not obviously parks, such as “playgrounds . . . sidewalks and parking lots.”316 These permitting 
requirements effectively operate to restrict begging throughout large portions of public space.   
 
Public parks are imperative to individuals experiencing homelessness because the parks 
often take on aspects of the home.317 Individuals experiencing homelessness rarely, if ever, 
have access to private spaces in which they can perform basic life sustaining activities such as 
sleeping and bathing. Not surprisingly, people experiencing homelessness are therefore forced 
                                                             
312 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educs.’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
313 So, Scott, Olson & Mansell, supra note 47, at 35 (explaining that the realities of homeless mobility make 
providing a permanent address impractical, if not impossible). Even if food banks, shelters, and other service 
offices were used as a permanent address, people experiencing homelessness would not likely receive the actual 
notice due to the realities of homeless mobility. 
314 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.030(A) (2010). 
315 Battle Ground MC § 8.18.040 (1999); Burien MC § 7.30.310 (2007); Des Moines MC § 19.08.030(6) (1988); Monroe 
MC § 9.28.100 (1990); Mukilteo MC § 9.60.090 (2009); Redmond § 9.32.100 (1982); Sammamish MC § 7.12.610 
(2014); Spokane MC § 10.10.40 (2007); Spokane Valley MC § 6.05.090(L) (2003); Sunnyside MC § 12.04.020(E) 
(1956). 
316 Battle Ground MC § 8.18.020 (1999); see also Longview MC § 13.01.005(1)(f) (1989) (defining “park” as “all public 
parks, public squares, golf courses, bathing beaches, and play and recreation grounds within the city limits”); 
Puyallup MC § 9.20.005(8) (2005) (defining “park” as “an area under the ownership, management, or control of the 
city used for public recreation, leisure, and park purposes”); Spokane Valley MC § 6.05.010 (2003) (defining “facility” 
as “any building . . . shelter . . . or other physical property including but not limited to . . . lawns, play equipment, 
tables, picnic areas, athletic fields, trails, or parking and pedestrian areas (including curbs, sidewalks and driveways 
or internal roads)”); Sammamish MC § 7.12.010(10) (defining “facility” as “any building, structure, or park area 
operated by the City . . . department of parks and recreation”).  
317 Don Mitchell, The End of Public Space? People’s Park, Definitions of the Public, and Democracy, 85 ANNALS ASS’N 






to do these activities in public space.318 When cities place restrictions on begging within public 
parks, the possible areas of reprieve for the city’s most vulnerable population grows smaller 
and smaller. Despite the popularity of begging restrictions in parks, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has long held that parks are “quintessential public fora,” where the “government’s power to 
regulate speech is most constrained.”319  In such a public forum, governments may enact only 
limited regulations on speech.320 Park permitting requirements too often cross the line into 
impermissible content-based restrictions, resulting in the suffocation of speech in public fora.  
 
For example, Des Moines’ park use regulations, enacted in 1988 and most recently 
updated in 2017, prohibits begging in all city parks.321 The ordinance reads, “No person shall 
take up collections, or act as or play the vocation of solicitor [or] beggar . . . without first 






















                                                             
318 Id.    
319 McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F.  Supp. 3d 177, 185 (2015). 
320 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educs’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
321 Des Moines MC § 19.08.030(7) (1988). 
322 Des Moines MC § 19.08.030(6) (1988). 
323 City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P.3d 1056 (2016). In Willis, the court considered a ban on begging at freeway ramps 
and major intersections and held that the ban was facially overbroad and “imposed a content-based restriction in a 
substantial number of traditional public forums.” 
324 Id. 
Recap of Applicable Law: 
City of Lakewood v. Willis, established that a law that restricts a 
substantial amount of speech within traditional public forums is an 















The restriction is not likely to withstand judicial scrutiny. Just as with general permitting 
ordinances described above, park permitting requirements are a content-based restriction on 
protected speech. Not only does Des Moines’ prohibit the actual act of begging, it prohibits 
acting or playing the role of a “beggar.” An enforcing officer would have to listen to the 
content of the message being communicated to determine whether an individual violated Des 
Moines’ permitting ordinance.  
 
 
However, even if Des Moines’ 
ordinance is a content-neutral law, it is 
unlikely to even withstand intermediate 
scrutiny. In Washington, cities must show a 
compelling state interest for their content-
neutral laws to withstand intermediate 
scrutiny.325 With Des Moines’ park 
permitting ordinance, the city has stated 
that the law was enacted to further the 
“best interest of the public health, safety, 
and general welfare.”326  While public safety 
is a compelling interest, there is no 
connection between protected peaceful 
begging and any safety risk. Unless Des Moines can produce meaningful evidence-based data 
to support its assertion that the permitting ordinance is necessary for public health, safety, and 
general welfare, the ordinance is likely to be deemed unconstitutional.  
 
Des Moines’ ordinance prohibits substantial speech within a traditional public forum. 
Regardless of whether Des Moines’ ordinance is categorized as content-based or content-
neutral, the city would be unlikely to win a constitutional challenge to the ordinance because it 
is likely to be found overbroad for prohibiting substantial speech within a traditional public 
forum. 
B. Restrictions on When Individuals Can Beg: Time Restrictions 
 
Another common way to curb begging is to restrict when begging may be performed.327  
Frequently, Washington cities designate a broad period of time when individuals may not beg. 
                                                             
325 The Washington Supreme Court has raised the standard for content-neutral laws based on the State 
constitution. Collier v. City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046, 1051(1993) (holding “[w]e diverge from the Supreme Court 
on the state interest element of the time, place, and manner test, ‘as we believe restrictions on speech can be 
imposed consistent with [the State constitution] only upon a showing a compelling state interest.’’”). 
326 Des Moines, Wash., Ordinance 1675 (Mar. 28, 2017), 
http://www.desmoineswa.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/1561.  
327 See, e.g., Auburn MC § 9.18.050 (2002); Issaquah § 9.45.040 (2008); Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010); Lakewood 
MC § 5.56.060 (1998); Marysville MC § 6.37.045 (2014); Monroe MC § 9.35.040(A) (2008); Mukilteo MC § 9.54.040 
(1977); Mukilteo MC § 5.04.120(D) (1995); Sunnyside MC § 9.86.050(E) (1978); Tacoma MC § 8.13A.030(b) (2007). 
 
Des Moines’ ordinance is unlikely to 
survive judicial scrutiny because the 
city is unlikely to produce 
meaningful evidence-based data to 
support its asserted compelling 
interest of public safety; 
alternatively, the ordinance is likely 
to be found overbroad for 
prohibiting substantial speech within 




For example, one law prohibited begging “on public property or in the residential area of the 
city between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.”328 Another law covered more than half the 
day, prohibiting begging within the city between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m.329 Other 
cities simply prohibit begging on public property “after sunset or before sunrise.”330 
 
Issaquah’s Regulation of Solicitation ordinance, which 
includes a blanket prohibition on begging after sunset, is one 
example of a common time restriction.332  Specifically, the 
ordinance states it is “unlawful to make solicitation to 
pedestrians on public property after sunset or before 
sunrise.”333 Solicitation is defined as “any means of asking, 
begging, requesting, or pleading made in person, orally or in 
a written or printed manner, directed to another person, 
requesting an immediate donation of money . . . .”334  
 
Issaquah’s ordinance is a content-based restriction on speech. The law does not 
prohibit all communications after sunset; rather, it prohibits sharing a very specific message—
requests for immediate donations of money. The law further applies to all areas of public 
property, which unequivocally qualifies as a public forum. Accordingly, to survive judicial 
scrutiny, the law must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly 
tailored to achieve that end.335 Like many of the surveyed cities, Issaquah’s anti-begging 
ordinance purports to serve a compelling public safety interest.336 Specifically, the ordinance 
aims “to regulate and punish acts of coercive and aggressive begging, and acts of begging that 
occur at locations or under circumstances . . . which create an enhanced sense of fear or 
intimidation in the person being solicited, or pose risk to traffic and public safety.”337 In 
essence, the city argues that every request for help made after sunset is inherently and 
unavoidably aggressive or coercive, a stunning claim for which the city can likely provide no 
scientific support. 
 
Courts have long held that time-based prohibitions on begging are unconstitutional 
when the city cannot cite meaningful evidence establishing that blanket prohibitions on 
panhandling at night are necessary to advance public safety.338 Although Issaquah has a 
                                                             
328 See Auburn MC § 9.18.050(E) (2002); Sunnyside MC § 9.86.050(E) (1978). 
329 See, e.g., Mukilteo MC § 9.54.040 (1977). 
330 See, e.g., Centralia MC § 10.37.040 (2014); Issaquah MC § 9.45.040 (2008); Marysville MC § 6.37.045 (2014); 
Monroe MC § 9.35.040 (2008); Tacoma 13.A.030(A)(2)(b) (2007). 
331 Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1292 (D. Colo. 2015). 
332 Issaquah MC § 9.45.040 (2008). 
333 Id. 
334 Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(B) (2008) (emphasis added). 
335 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educs.’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
336 Issaquah MC § 9.45.010 (2008). 
337 Id. 
338 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 235 (D. Mass. 2015). 
 
Blanket prohibitions on 
begging after dark are 
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significant interest in promoting safety in its public areas after dark, a court would likely find 
Issaquah’s content-based prohibition against begging between sunset and sunrise not 
narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.339 The time restriction prohibits “any means of . . . 
begging. . . orally. . . or written” or “requests for items of service of value after dark.”340 The 
ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it encompasses peaceful begging that does 
not threaten public safety without leaving alternate means of communication.341  
  
Courts have considered and dismissed laws that make no 
distinction between harmful conduct and innocent behavior.342 
Courts have also dismissed overbroad laws that prohibit 
protected speech that does not threaten safety.343 Because 
“[t]here is no indication that panhandling at night . . . is 
inherently dangerous or threatening to the public,” a blanket 
prohibition on begging after dark is overbroad and is not the 
least restrictive means of keeping the public safe.344  The law 
does not mention particular conduct, instead presupposing that 
all requests for help after sunset inherently and incurably create 
an enhanced sense of fear or intimidation. The ordinance also excludes all forms of begging, 
including written requests for aid.345 Between sunset and sunrise, a person who passively holds 
a sign asking for aid risks a criminal record, severe fines, and jail time.346  
 
Laws that prohibit begging between sunset and sunrise are subject to vagueness 
challenges. Because these laws regulate expression protected by the First Amendment, there 
is a “heightened requirement for specificity.”347 Without designating a specific time, a “person 
                                                             
339 See id.; Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1292–93 (D. Colo. 2015) (The court found that an 
ordinance that made it unlawful for any person to panhandle “[o]ne-half (1/2) hour after sunset to one-half (1/2) 
hour before sunrise” was not narrowly tailored to serve the city’s valid interest of public safety; the ordinance was 
over-inclusive because it prohibited protected speech that posed no threat to public safety). 
340 Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(B) (2008). 
341 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 235 (D. Mass. 2015) (holding that a blanket prohibition on 
soliciting from 30 minutes after sunset to 30 minutes after sunrise unconstitutionally overbroad). 
342 See id. at 1292–93 (emphasizing that a prohibition on begging at night was “over-inclusive” because it 
prohibited “protected speech that poses no threat to public safety”); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059, 
1061 (Wash. 1973) (overturning Seattle’s curfew ordinance as an unconstitutional exercise of the city’s police 
power because it made “no distinction between conduct calculated to harm” and “innocent behavior”). 
343 See Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1292–93 (D. Colo. 2015) (emphasizing that a 
prohibition on begging at night was “over-inclusive” because it prohibited “protected speech that poses no threat 
to public safety”); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Wash. 1973) (overturning Seattle’s curfew 
ordinance as an unconstitutional exercise of the city’s police power because it made “no distinction between 
conduct calculated to harm” and “innocent behavior”). 
344 Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1292 (D. Colo. 2015). 
345 Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(B) (2008). 
346 See Issaquah § MC 9.45.060 (2008). 
347 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (demanding a greater degree of specificity when “a statute’s literal 












of ordinary intelligence” might not know at what exact time begging is prohibited.348 “The hour 
of ‘sun set’ on any given day, as it might appear to different persons, could hardly be expected 
to be accurately observed. . . . One person might conclude the sun had set, and another might 
not think so.”349 This lack of clarity raises possible violations of due process because of the 
possibility of both discriminatory enforcement and lack of notice of the law.350 
 
Finally, many individuals are heading to work before 9:00 a.m. and leaving work 
between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. Time restrictions that prohibit begging during 
such periods of high foot traffic effectively prohibit begging when it is most likely to occur; 
these busy hours are the time when people are most likely to receive help when they ask.  
 
C. Restrictions on Where Individuals Can Beg: Place and Distance Restrictions 
 
[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate 
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.351 
 
Besides restricting when individuals can beg, many cities go to great lengths to control 
where individuals can beg by enacting place and distance restrictions.352 
 
A few ordinances outright prohibit begging throughout the entire city limits.353 Cities 
with such laws justify targeting the free speech of poor individuals by suggesting that even 
                                                             
348 People ex rel. Springfield, E. & S. R. Co. v. Bishop, 111 Ill. 124, 135–36 (1884). 
349 Id. at 135–36. 
350 See Mass. Fair Share, Inc. v. Rockland, 610 F. Supp. 682, 690 (D. Mass. 1985) (concluding that the failure to define 
the term “sunset” and “daylight hours” in an ordinance raises the spectra of both chilling effect and discriminatory 
enforcement); West Virginia. Citizens Action Grp. v. Daley, 324 S.E.2d 713, 720–21 (1984) (concluding that the failure 
to define the term “sunset” in an ordinance rendered the ordinance unconstitutionally vague and that “[a] fine line 
drawn through dusk is too slender a thread upon which to hang the exercise of fundamental free speech rights”). 
351 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). 
352 See, e.g., Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(6)(b) (2002); Bremerton MC § 9A.44.140(b) (2014); Centralia MC 
§ 10.37.050(C) (2014); Covington MC § 9.190.040 (2010); Lacey MC § 5.21.30 (1998); Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 
(2010); Marysville MC § 6.37.047 (2014); Mountlake Terrace MC § 9.40.40 (2015); Pasco MC § 9.44.060 (2013); 
Redmond MC § 5.08.035 (1988); Spokane MC § 10.10.25(B) (2015); Spokane MC § 10.10.27 (2008); Sunnyside MC 
§ 5.22.050 (2007); Sunnyside MC § 9A.86.050 (1978); Tacoma MC § 8.13A.030(A) (2007); Yakima MC § 6.75.025 
(2013). 
353 See Maple Valley MC § 5.05.080(A) (1999) (“No person shall solicit contributions for himself in or upon any 
public street or public place in the City of Maple Valley.”). 
 










peaceful or silent requests for help pose a danger to the public simply because the request is 
made near a specific location.354 Laws that restrict individuals’ access to public streets and 
sidewalks for speech defy the “hallowed . . . [F]irst [A]mendment doctrine,” which protects the 
right to engage in speech in a traditional public forum.355 Much like public parks, traditional 
public fora include “streets, sidewalks, and roadways,” and are “subject to the strictest free 
speech protections.”356  As Justice Owen Roberts wrote: 
 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and . . . have 
been used for the purposes of . . . communicating thoughts between 
citizens . . . . Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of 
citizens.357 
 
Cities can exclude a person from “a traditional public forum ‘only when the exclusion is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that interest.’”358 Throughout Washington, courts closely scrutinize and often strike down laws 
that restrict substantial speech in traditional public fora.359 For example, in City of Lakewood v. 
Willis, the Washington Supreme Court recently found two provisions of Lakewood’s “Begging 
in Restrictive Areas” ordinance unconstitutional because the provisions were facially overbroad 
“content-based speech restriction[s] in a substantial number of traditional public forums.”360  
Specifically, Lakewood’s ordinance prohibited begging “(1) at on and off ramps leading to and 
from state intersections from any City roadway or overpass; (2) at intersections of 
major/principal arterials (or islands on the principal arterials) in the city….”361  The city defined 
begging as “asking for money or goods as charity, whether by words, bodily gestures, signs or 
other means."362 The court began its analysis of the constitutionality of the provisions by 
analyzing the type of forum in which the laws operated.363 The court found that the ordinance 
                                                             
354 See, e.g., Auburn MC § 9.08.010(6)(b) (2002) (prohibiting begging from people in vehicles at intersections 
controlled by traffic signals); Sunnyside MC § 9.86.050(B) (1978) (prohibiting begging within 10 feet of any 
entrance or exit of any building in use by the public); Sunnyside MC § 9.86.050(A) (1978) (prohibiting begging in 
public streets or alleys); Tacoma MC § 8.13A.030(A)(1)(g) (2007) (prohibiting begging within 15 feet of any parked 
vehicle where people are entering or exiting the vehicle); Renton MC § 6.25.1(B) (1997) (stating that begging 
within 25 feet of an ATM machine is presumptively aggressive). 
355 Anthony J. Rose, Note, The Beggar’s Free Speech Claim, 65 IND. L.J. 191, 204 (1989). 
356 City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P.3d 1056, 1059 (Wash. 2016). 
357 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
358 MICHAEL A. ZIZKA ET. AL., STATE & LOCAL LAND USE LIABILITY: § 17:13 USE OF PUBLIC LANDS (Dec. 2017) (citing 
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998)).  
359 See City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1059 (Wash. 2016). 
360 Id. at 1064. 
361 Id. at 1057–58. 
362 Id. at 1057. 
363 Id. at 1064 (writing “[a] law restricting speech is subject to different levels of scrutiny, depending on the ‘forum 
in which it operates. Thus, in a First Amendment challenge, we begin by identifying the forum at issue. A law 





applied to locations that were “likely to have sidewalks, which are generally held to be 
traditional public for[as].”364 The court ultimately concluded that the provisions covered a 
substantial number of locations in traditional public fora because the provisions applied to 
every sidewalk at “on and off ramps leading to and from state intersections…” and “at 
intersections of major/principal arterials…in the city[.]”365 Next, the court stated that while 
cities can impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, they cannot impose 
content-based restrictions on speech.366 After consulting the Supreme Court’s definition of 
content-based laws in Reed,367 the court concluded that Lakewood’s ordinance was content-
based because it did not prohibit solicitation generally, but only prohibited solicitation with a 
particular purpose of obtaining money as charity.368 Lakewood’s provisions were found 
unconstitutional.369 
The concurrence in Willis also acknowledged that the 
city’s other location-based ordinances were vulnerable to 
overbreadth challenges.370 A law is overbroad when it 
restricts substantially more speech than necessary to achieve 
a legitimate public interest.371 Courts are concerned that laws 
prohibiting too many behaviors related to speech can “chill a 
substantial amount of activity protected by the First 
Amendment,”372 particularly when the law “imposes criminal 
sanctions.”373 But this extensive, overbroad application is 
precisely that which is common in cities throughout 
Washington. 
 
Given Washington precedent, a court would likely find that prohibiting begging at such 
an expansive list of locations in traditional public fora (as seen in City of Lakewood v. Willis) is 
unconstitutionally overbroad. For example, laws that prohibit begging near bus stops or 
                                                             
neutral narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.”) (internal citations omitted). 
364 Id. at 1062 (the court stated that a sidewalk can be a nonpublic forum in some circumstances, but the city did 
not meet its burden of showing that the sidewalks existed to solely facilitate access to a private locations).  
365 Id. at 1063. 
366 Id.  
367 “[A] law is content based if ‘on its face [it]…define[s] regulated speech by particular subject matter…[or] by its 
function or purpose.” Id.  
368 Id. 
369 Id. at 1064. 
370 Id. at 1064 (Stephens, J., concurring) (“[e]xamining the entire ordinance under which the City charged Willis, I 
conclude that LMC 9A.04.020A is facially overbroad. While the ordinance might conceivably have legitimate 
applications in nonpublic areas, on its face, it substantially restricts protected speech in a wide range of public for[a] 
traditionally open to First Amendment activity. And, on its face, it targets a particular category of protected speech, 
making it an unconstitutional content-based restriction under…Reed[.]”) (internal citations omitted). 
371 Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2013). 
372 Id. at 878. 
373 Id. (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003)); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 
(finding laws that impose “criminal penalties on protected speech . . . a stark example of speech suppression”). 
 
A court would likely 
find a law prohibiting 
begging at expansive 
locations in traditional 






business entrances might still fail judicial scrutiny because bus stops and business entrances 
are themselves within the public fora. Although some city officials might bristle at such critical 
review of begging ordinances, the fact remains that local laws must conform to constitutional 
requirements that protect all residents, not just residents with stable housing.374 
 
 Once again, the City of Lakewood provides a specific example. In addition to the 
permitting requirements previously outlined,following Lakewood v. Willis, the city of 
Lakewood continues to restrict range of distance for solicitors. The city has two ordinances 
with specific distances restrictions on soliciting within the city.375 The ordinances and the 
specific restrictions are detailed in the table below. 
 
Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050:  
Unlawful solicitations376 
Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A: Restrictive 
Areas377 
Defines solicitation as “any oral or written 
request for a contribution…any appeal is 
made for any charitable purpose.” 
Defines begging as “asking for money or 
goods or charity, whether by words, bodily 
gestures, signs or other means.” 
Exempts “any organizations which are… 
operated principally for charitable 
purposes, other than the raising of funds, 
when the solicitation of contributions is 
confined to the bona fide membership of 
the organization. . .” 
No exemptions. 
Unlawful to solicit:  
• in public streets/alleys or to solicit 
anyone who is “in or upon” public 
streets/alleys;  
• within ten feet of any crosswalk or 
any entrance or exit of a building 
used by the general public; or 
• from any sidewalk within ten feet of 
its intersection with an alley or 
driveway. 
Unlawful to solicit:  
• within twenty-five feet of an ATM 
or financial institution;  
• within fifteen feet of any occupied 
“handicapped” parking space, bus 
stop, train station; or 
•  in any public parking lot, structure, 
or walkway dedicated to such 
parking lot or structure;  
• before sunrise or after sunset at any 
public transportation facility or on 
any public transportation vehicle. 
                                                             
374 See Michael Simpson, ACLU Raises Concerns with Lakewood’s Rewrite of Panhandling Law, NEWS TRIBUNE (Feb. 
23, 2017). After the Washington State Supreme Court’s ruling in Willis, Lakewood Mayor Don Anderson decried 
the Court’s “activist . . . attempts to legislate policy rather than interpret the law.” Id. Such a statement reveals a 
common misunderstanding by elected officials as to the constitutionally protected nature of begging as speech 
and the court’s role in enforcing those protections. 
375 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010) and MC § 9A.04.020A. 
376 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010). 






First, Lakewood’s restrictions close off many downtown areas and access points that, 
besides being traditional public fora, are the most logical places to beg. Specifically, the 
ordinances impose restrictions on begging in public streets and alley or attempting to beg 
anyone in public streets or alleys;378  they prohibit begging from any sidewalk within ten feet of 
a public driveway or alley;379  and they prohibit begging within fifteen feet of any bus stop or 
train station.380  
 
These restrictions are hardly intuitive; a person experiencing homelessness would have 
no reasonable way of knowing where they may ask for help or where they risk incurring a fine 
or incarceration. For example, the image below shows a satellite photo of a downtown area in 
Lakewood. Based on the ordinance, the image shows red boxes indicating peripheries within 
ten or fifteen feet of which an individual cannot beg. The blue lines enclose public streets that 
are also prohibited areas for begging. As illustrated below, when considering that Lakewood 
MC § 9A.04.020A also prohibits begging in any parking lot,381 much of the geographic area 
within Lakewood becomes a “restricted area” where individuals cannot ask for help without 




Second, Lakewood’s ordinances impose content-based restrictions on speech. 
Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050, while at first glance may appear to be content-neutral because it 
appears to impose restrictions on solicitation in general, the separate provisions of the 
ordinance work together to create a content-based restriction. Specifically, Lakewood MC 
                                                             
378 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010). 
379 Id.  






§ 9A.05.050 defines solicitation as a request for a charitable purpose.382 In analyzing whether 
Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 imposes a content-based restriction on speech, one need only look 
as far as Lakewood v. Willis, where the court found that Lakewood's previous law was content-
based because it did not prohibit solicitation generally, but only solicitation with a particular 
purpose of obtaining money as charity.383  Similarly, Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 prohibits 
solicitations requested for charitable purposes, not solicitation generally.384 
 
Third, even if both ordinances were content-neutral, a court would likely find they fail 
to leave open alternative channels of communications. For example, Lakewood’s ordinances 
prohibit both oral and written requests for help. Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 defines solicitation 
as “oral or written” requests for contributions,385 and Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A defines 
begging as “asking for money…whether by words, bodily gestures, signs or other means.”386  
The city’s ordinances fail to allow individuals alternative means of communicating their need 
for help. The city could allow for passive sign-holding in some locations,387 rather than 
prohibiting both oral and written requests for help; however, the ordinances literally prohibit 
all possible means of communicating a message. In considering any compelling interest that 
the city may assert as justification for these laws, the only threat to public safety might come 
from forceful, repeated verbal solicitations. But the ordinances do not distinguish between 
harmful conduct and peaceful begging—leaving the city vulnerable to overbreadth 
challenges.388  
 
Fourth, Lakewood’s ordinances place “buffer zones” around crosswalks, intersections, 
ATM’s and financial institutions, parking spaces, parking lots, train stations, and bus 
stations.389 Courts have found that while buffer zones around facilities like ATMs may be 
appropriate if they are the least restrictive means of meeting the city’s interest, buffer zones 
are not always required to protect public safety.390 Here, Lakewood’s buffer zones around 
crosswalks, “handicapped” parking spaces, bus stops, and train stops are unlikely to withstand 
judicial scrutiny because they are unlikely to be narrowly tailored to meet the compelling 
interest of public safety. For example, panhandling within buffer zones around bus stops has 
been described as “more bothersome” but not as “demonstrably more dangerous.”391 Absent 
evidence to the contrary, a court would likely find that Lakewood’s buffer zones are not the 
least restrictive means necessary to achieve a compelling interest.392 
 
 
                                                             
382 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010). 
383 City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016). 




388 Willis, 375 P.3d at 1064 (Stephens, J., concurring). 
389 Lakewood MC §§ 9A.05.050 (2010) & 9A.04.020 (2011). 
390 McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d. 177, 196 (D. Mass. 2015). 
391 Id. at 195. 




Overall, place and distance restrictions raise serious constitutional concerns because 
they limit otherwise protected speech in traditional public fora—a cherished space for free 
speech protections. These place and distance restrictions do not try to hide the fact that they 
are entirely content-based restrictions, which stifle the 
exercise of one form of speech but not others. Although a 
resident may stand near a crosswalk or bus stop 
advertising local businesses or asking motorists to vote for 
an upcoming candidate, that same resident may face 
criminal penalties when the content of her speech shifts 
from business advertising or political lobbying to a request 
for help. Washington’s Supreme Court has already 
signaled its willingness to strike down such hopelessly 
unconstitutional ordinances. 
 
D. Restrictions on How Individuals Can Beg: Manner Restrictions 
 
The last category of anti-begging laws includes sweeping restrictions on how begging 
can be performed. These ordinances are often labeled to suggest they target “aggressive” or 
“coercive” begging. However, such categorization is misleading because these laws are often 
“designed to be enforced against people who are engaging in harmless activities when 
requesting a donation.”393  
 
Aggressive begging ordinances are typically not triggered by the intentionally 
aggressive or coercive behavior of the panhandler; rather, culpability is most often triggered by 
the “reasonable fear” of the listener.394 But as discussed above, studies show that society 
frequently responds to evidence of visible poverty and human desperation with fear.395 This 
fear is so common that even peaceful non-coercive begging can be interpreted as frightening 
or disturbing to people who witness it. Compelling sociological studies show that mere 
exposure to visible poverty triggers highly negative reactions from those who witness it.396 
Thus, begging restrictions that turn on a witness’s perception—as opposed to some objective 
measure of conduct—are overbroad. People asking for help could be punished not because of 
anything they did but because of how their conduct was perceived.  
 
1. The Problem with Perception-Based Definitions of Aggressive Begging 
 
A core principle of criminal law is that culpability attaches based on conduct. It is our 
knowing and intentional decision to engage in wrongful conduct—the mens rea—that makes a 
bad act unlawful. Yet laws deriving culpability on the subjective perception of the victim turns 
this core concept of criminal law on its head, attaching criminal liability without the accused 
                                                             
393 See NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 20. 
394 See Ordinance Chart, supra note 180. 
395 See Rankin 2015, supra note 55. 
396 Id. 
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having any intention of wrongdoing. More important, speakers have no way of knowing what 
conduct is acceptable under the law. Individuals will inevitably be forced to censor or silence 
their speech out of fear it could be interpreted as a threat by the “reasonable” person who 
happens to hear, see, or read their message.  
 
By far the most common, 96% of all aggressive 
begging laws in Washington include a subjective 
perception-based component.398 For example, many 
ordinances begin by defining “aggressive begging” as 
asking for help “with the intent to intimidate another 
person into giving money or goods.”399 But intimidation is 
most often defined as “engag[ing] in conduct which would 
make a reasonable person feel fearful or compelled.”400 Even attempting to ground the law in 
the accused’s “intent to intimidate,” the laws define intimidation wholly on the subjective 
standards of the listener. Such an approach to criminalization presents several constitutional 
concerns and erodes the breathing space that safeguards the free exchange of ideas.401  
 
  Perception-based laws make it challenging to know whether a reasonable person feels 
fearful or compelled because of the speaker’ specific conduct or because a visibly poor person 
subconsciously elicits feelings of discomfort or even repulsion.402 Both the appearance of a 
visibly poor person and the circumstances of asking for help make one feel compelled, whether 
by fear or sympathy, to make a donation. When the mere sight of visible poverty triggers 
                                                             
397 Ordinance Chart, supra note 180. 
398 Id. 
399 Anacortes MC § 9.24.050 (1999); Arlington MC § 9.56.020(1) (2014) (“with the intent to intimidate or coerce. . .”) 
(emphasis added); Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Bellevue MC § 10.06.010(B)(1) (2005); Bonney Lake MC § 
9.11.060(A) (2016) (“‘Aggressive solicitation’ means behavior that is intended to harass or intimidate . . .”); 
Bremerton MC § 9A.44.110(b) (2014); Des Moines MC §  9.68.030(2), (1)(a) & (c) (1988); Everett MC § 9.52.010(A)(2) 
(1987); Federal Way RMC §  6.35.030(1)(a),(2) (1994); Lake Stevens MC § 9.08.030(b)(1) (2012); Marysville MC § 
6.37.020(1) (2012) (“with the intent to intimidate or coerce . . .) (emphasis added); Moses Lake MC § 9.22.010 (2011); 
Mount Vernon MC § 9.21.060(A) (2011); Oak Harbor MC § 6.95.030(2), 020(1) (2013) (“with the intent to intimidate 
or coerce. . .”) (emphasis added); Port Angeles MC § 11.18.020(A) (2005); Renton MC § 6-25-1 (1997). 
400  See, e.g., Arlington MC  § 9.56.020(7) (2014); Bonney Lake MC §  9.11.060(c) (2016) (intimidate “means to coerce 
or frighten into submission or obedience or to engage in conduct which would make a reasonable person fearful or 
feel compelled to give the person money or goods.”); Bremerton MC §  9A.44.110(a)(1) (2014); Everett MC  § 
9.52.020(D) (1987); Federal Way RMC § 6.35.030(1)(e) (1994) (Intimidate “means to engage in words or conduct 
which would make a reasonable person feel compelled to give money to a person”); Port Angeles MC 11.18.020(B) 
(2005); Renton MC § 6-25-1 (1997) (intimidate “means to use words or engage in conduct that would likely cause a 
reasonable person to fear bodily harm, fear damage to or loss of property, or otherwise be compelled into giving 
money or other things of value”); Sammamish MC § 22.05.110(b) (2000); Seattle MC § 12A.12.015(A)(2) (1987); 
University Place MC § 9.55.010 (2)(A)(2) (2004); Vancouver MC § 7.04.030(3) (2003). 
401 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). 
402 See Rankin 2015, supra note 55, at 390 (citing Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the 
Low: Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 10, 848 (2006)); Steven J. Ballew, 
Panhandling and the First Amendment: How Spider-Man Is Reducing the Quality of Life in New York City, 81 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1167, 1168, 1171–72 (2016).  
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fearful reactions, how can a person experiencing homelessness hope to ask for help in 
conformance with the law? How can a police officer, responding to a complaint, be expected to 
reliably determine which impulse led to the donation? In these situations, even peaceful 
begging can trigger a conviction for aggressive begging based on the reaction of the person 
being solicited.403 The Supreme Court has “explained [that] a regulation is not vague because it 
may at times be difficult to prove . . . but rather [it is vague] because it is unclear as to what fact 
must be proved.”404 While these aggressive begging laws are popular Washington ordinances, 
it is often unclear what facts support a conviction under an aggressive begging ordinance 
above and beyond the mere appearance of a visibly poor person and the peaceful exercise of 
free speech.405  
 
The simplest solution to this problem would be to 
replace perception-based ordinances with objective conduct-
based ordinances that specifically describe how a person 
cannot ask for help. But even then, such ordinances would 
impact the exercise of free speech and would need to be 
narrowly tailored to conform to the strict scrutiny standard. 
As illustrated below, manner-based components to 
aggressive begging laws are often overly broad and 
criminalize otherwise lawful conduct. 
 
2. Not in that Way: Conduct-Based Begging Laws 
 
Municipalities attempt to avoid judicial scrutiny of their anti-begging restrictions by 
prohibiting different conduct under the guise of protecting public health and safety.406 
However, these attempts fail when the prohibited conduct is attached to a regulatory scheme 
that targets a particular form of expression, like immediate requests for donations.407 In one 
example, a city in Illinois added a conduct-based element to an ordinance that prohibited oral 
requests for money after the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was a 
                                                             
403 See NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 20 (stating that laws “purportedly aimed at curbing threatening . . . 
behavior . . . are sometimes designed to be enforced against . . . harmless activities” like begging).  
404 F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012). 
405 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (asserting that the Supreme Court has “struck down statutes 
that tied . . . culpability to . . . wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context or 
settled legal meanings”).  
406 See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.010(1) (2014) (stating that its solicitation and camping regulations serve to “protect 
and preserve the public safety of pedestrians and to insure the safe and efficient movement of pedestrian and 
vehicular traffic in public places”); Lacey MC § 5.21.010 (1998) (stating that its begging regulations serve the purpose 
of promoting “the health, safety, peace, and general welfare” of its citizens and visitors). 
407 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d. 177, 185 (2015) (noting that a law purporting to regulate 
conduct accompanying expression will be subject to strict scrutiny when it “targets a particular form of expressive 
speech—the solicitation of immediate charitable donations—and applies its regulatory scheme only to that subject 
matter”);  Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 221 (D. Mass. 2015) (interpreting a content-based 
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form of content discrimination and was subject to strict scrutiny.408 The new addition 
prohibited individuals from requesting a donation “while knowingly approaching within five 
feet’" of the person solicited.409 When the modified ordinance was re-challenged, the city 
argued that the ordinance “regulate[d] activity, not speech.”410 However, the Seventh Circuit 
again held that the ordinance was a content-based restriction on speech because it restricted 
individuals from approaching a person while asking for a donation but allowed individuals to 
approach a person while engaging in other types of speech.411 Following the Court’s analysis in 
Reed, the analysis of the Seventh Circuit represents a growing trend of courts invalidating 
aggressive begging laws.   
 
Many begging restrictions target such a broad array of conduct they would fail judicial 
tests that require restrictions of speech to be the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling governmental interest.412 For example, many of the surveyed cities413 prohibit (1) 
approaching within a certain distance of a person without receiving that person’s consent;414 
(2) persisting in begging after being given a negative response;415 (3) begging in the company 
of any other person;416 (4) begging with a child;417 (5) begging from anyone under the age of 
sixteen;418 (6) using false or misleading information while begging for the purpose of making a 
                                                             
408 Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1173 (2016). 
409 Norton v. City of Springfield, No. 15-3276, 2015 WL 8023461, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2015) (quoting Springfield MC 
§ 131.06(a)(1)). 
410 Id. at *2 (quoting Springfield MC § 131.06(a)(1)). 
411 “Although the language of the current ordinance has been modified, it still addresses the content of the plaintiffs' 
speech. The plaintiffs can ask for the time, talk about the weather, ask someone to sign a petition, or even solicit 
support (either nonmonetary support or for a future contribution) for causes or organizations while approaching 
within five feet of the person being addressed. However, the plaintiffs are not permitted to ask pedestrians for ‘an 
immediate donation of money or other gratuity’ while ‘knowingly approaching within five feet’ of the individual. 
The ordinance subjects the Plaintiffs to criminal penalties for asking for immediate donations of money in those 
circumstances.” Id. 
412 Supra Part I, Section B. 
413 In addition to perception and conduct, most cities include the “place” and “distance” provisions, discussed in 
Section III, Part C of this Brief (e.g., near bus stops, ATMs, intersections, and gas stations) in their “aggressive” 
begging ordinances, which purport to serve as evidence of aggressive begging. 
414 See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(B) (2014); Centralia MC § 10.37.030 (2014); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(b) 
(2010); Issaquah MC §9.45.020(A)(2) (2008); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(A) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(1) (2008); 
Marysville MC 6.37.020(2)(b) (2012); Monroe MC § 9.35.020(A)(2) (2008); Oak Harbor MC § 6.95.020(2)(b) (2014). 
415 See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(C) (2014) (persisting provision); Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.060(A)(a) (2016) 
(persisting and following provisions); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(c) (2010) (persisting provision); Federal Way 
RMC § 6.35.030(1)(e)(i)–(ii) (1994) (persisting and following provisions); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(3) (persisting 
provision); Marysville MC § 6.37.020(2)(c) (2012) (persisting provision); Monroe MC § 9.35.020(A)(3) (2008) 
(persisting provision); Oak Harbor MC 6.95.020(2)(c) (2014) (persisting provision). Bonney Lake explains “negative 
statements” as those statements that communicate that the individual does “not intend to donate.” Bonney Lake 
MC § 9.11.060 (2016). 
416 See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(G) (1998). 
417 See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.070 (2014); Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.050(B) 
(2016); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(h) (2010); Renton MC § 6-25-1 (1997); SeaTac MC § 8.05.740(B)(1)(d) (1995).  
418 See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(D) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(4) (2008). This type of prohibited conduct is 





solicitation;419 (7) engaging with the driver of a parked car;420 (8) begging and blocking or 
impeding pedestrian traffic;421 and (9) begging for the purpose of soliciting vehicular traffic.422 
 
Although each point listed above might appear to 
refer to conduct, they are tied to the content of the speech 
being communicated. Content-neutral laws already exist 
to prohibit many of the above behaviors.423 For a police 
officer to find a violation of the above laws, the officer 
must evaluate the message being communicated. Because 
these laws specifically target begging and have the 
potential of chilling peaceful constitutionally protected 
requests for donations, they are both content-based restrictions on speech and subject to strict 
scrutiny. A closer examination of each manner-based provision reveals the constitutional 
infirmities. For instance, many of the surveyed cities prohibit individuals from coming within a 
certain distance of another person to make a solicitation without receiving that person’s 
consent.424 But what qualifies as consent? Is a smile, a nod, a gesture, or a look of 
acknowledgment sufficient, or must consent be verbally expressed? Further, it is unclear 
whether the solicitor must obtain the consent of the person before or after making the 
request.425 Because these provisions do not provide fair notice of what is prohibited, they may 
fail under a constitutional challenge for vagueness.426 
                                                             
419 See, e.g., Auburn MC 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Centralia MC § 10.37.020(B)(7) (2014); Covington MC 
§ 9.190.020(1)(g) (2010); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(6) (2008); Lakewood MC § 05.56.140 (1998); Marysville MC 
§ 6.37.020(2)(f) (2012); Monroe MC § 9.35.020(A)(6) (2008); Oak Harbor MC § 6.95.020(2)(f); SeaTac 
MC § 8.05.740(B)(1) (1995). 
420 See, e.g., Mount Vernon MC § 9.21.050(E)(1)(g) (2011); Lacey MC § 5.21.030(C) (1998); Tacoma 13.A.030(A)(1)(g) 
(2007). 
421 See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(D) (2014); Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Bonney Lake MC 
§ 9.11.060(A)(2) (2016); Centralia MC § 10.37.020(B)(4) (2014); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(d) (2010); Everett MC § 
9.52.010(A)(1) (1987); Federal Way RMC § 6.35.030(1)(c), (2)(b) (1994); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(4) (2008); Lacey 
MC § 5.21.040(B) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(2) (2008); Marysville MC § 6.37.020(2)(d) (2012); Monroe MC § 
9.35.020(A)(4) (2008); Puyallup MC § 9A.08.020(2)(c) (2009); Sunnyside MC § 5.22.050(C) (2007); Tacoma MC § 
8.13.A.020(B)(3) (2007); Wenatchee MC § 6A.13.020(1) (1989). 
422 Interestingly, these types of restrictions raise the question of why it is not illegal for business owners to solicit 
customers by waiving signs towards traffic. 
423 For example, many cities have content-neutral ordinances that prohibit harassment, fraud, and pedestrian 
interference. These content-neutral laws target the harmful behavior without infringing on constitutionally 
protected speech. 
424 See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(B) (2014) (one foot); Centralia MC § 10.37.030, 020(b) (2014) (two feet and 
provides progressive penalties); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(b) (2010) (one foot); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(2) 
(2008) (one foot); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(A) (1998) (three feet); Longview MC § 9.23.040(1)  (2008) (three feet); 
Marysville MC  § 6.37.020(2)(b) (2012)  (one foot); Monroe MC §  9.35.020(A)(2) (2008)  (one foot); Oak Harbor MC § 
6.95.020(2)(b) (2014) (one foot). 
425 Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 1276, 1297 (D. Colo. 2015).  
426 But cf. id. (finding that a law requiring consent before making a solicitation is not unconstitutionally vague 
under Due Process requirements because consent may be expressed via an affirmative statement or implied via 
action or inaction). 
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As another example, many of the surveyed cities prohibit individuals from (1) following 
a person to ask for money after that person has given a negative response427 and (2) continuing 
to beg from a person after that person has given a negative response.428 Aside from the 
vagueness of the phrase “negative response,” these “bans on following a person and 
panhandling after a person has given a negative response are not the least restrictive means 
available.”429 As the United States District Court of Massachusetts aptly explained: 
 
A panhandler who asks for change from a passerby might, after a 
rejection, seek to explain that the change is needed because she is 
unemployed or state that she will use it to buy food. These 
additional post-rejection messages do not necessarily threaten 
public safety; their explanations of the nature of poverty sit at the 
heart of what makes panhandling protected expressive conduct in 
the first place. Likewise, a panhandler might follow someone in 
order to convey a longer message. Both behaviors might be 
utilized where a promising target—someone who might want to 
hear a panhandler’s message—walks by a panhandler without 
noticing him at all. If panhandling is truly valuable expressive 
speech, then panhandlers may have a right to more than one shot 
at getting their message across.430 
 
In a third example, at least one of the surveyed cities prohibits individuals from begging 
in a group of two or more people.431 Prohibiting individuals from begging together, “whose 
                                                             
427 See, e.g., Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.060(A)(c) (2016) (“[f]ollowing a person for purposes of solicitation at a close 
distance where a reasonable person would be intimidated or in fear of their safety”); Federal Way RMC 
§ 6.35.030(2)(a), (1)(e)(i)–(ii) (1994); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(E) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(5) (2008) (“following 
a person who walks away from the panhandler, if the panhandler’s conduct is intended to or is reasonably likely to 
intimidate the person being solicited into responding affirmatively to the solicitation”); Spokane MC § 10.10.025 
(B)(1) (2015). 
428 See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(C) (2014); Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.060(A) (2016); Covington MC 
§ 9.190.020(1)(c) (2010); Federal Way Revised Code  § 6.35.030(1)(e)(i)–(ii) (1994); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(3) 
(2008); Marysville MC § 6.37.020(2)(c) (2012); Monroe MC § 9.35.020(A)(3) (2008); Oak Harbor § MC 6.95.020(2)(c) 
(2014); Puyallup MC § 9A.08.020(2)(b) (2009); Spokane MC § 10.10.025(B)(1) (2015); Sunnyside MC § 9.86.050(D) 
(2007); Tacoma MC § 8.13A.020(B)(2) (2007). 
429 McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 193 (D. Mass. 2015). 
430 Id. (emphasis added).  
431 See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(G) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “in a group of two or more 
persons, except where one or more panhandler(s) is/are under the age of eighteen and is/are the dependent 
child(ren) of the other panhandler”); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(H) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “within 
fifty feet of any other panhandler, except where one or more panhandler(s) is/are under the age of eighteen and 





activity is otherwise permissible,” fails to satisfy strict scrutiny.432 Such prohibitions violate 
both the First Amendment’s protection of speech and protection of assembly.433 Even if the 
city attempts to prohibit group begging in an “intimidating manner,” the law will not survive 
strict scrutiny “in the absence of . . . evidence. . . that ‘intimidating’ group panhandling is more 
dangerous than ‘intimidating’ solo panhandling.”434 
 
In many of the surveyed cities, begging prohibitions duplicate existing pedestrian 
interference provisions and obstruction of traffic laws.435 These laws commonly prohibit 
blocking or impeding pedestrian traffic and blocking, impeding, or distracting vehicular traffic 
while begging.436 Yet many cities already address the corresponding public safety concerns 
through facially neutral and constitutionally valid “obstruction of traffic” or “pedestrian 
interference” laws that apply to everyone regardless of the type of speech.437  
 
For example, Tacoma has a Solicitation by Coercion438 ordinance duplicative of its 








                                                             
432 See McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 194-95 (holding that group panhandling restrictions cannot survive strict 
scrutiny “in the absence of record evidence that panhandling in a group of two or more is a greater threat to public 
safety than panhandling alone”). 
433 Id. at 194 (holding that a prohibition on begging “in a group of two or more ‘in an intimidating’ manner” was 
vague because it did not define “intimidating,” and infringed upon the First Amendment’s protection of speech and 
of assembly). 
434 See id. at 195. 
435 For example, compare Mount Vernon MC § 9.21.050(F) (2011), which defines as a part of aggressive begging 
walking or standing “in such a manner as to block passage by another person or a vehicle,” with Mount Vernon MC 
§ 9.21.045(B) (2012), which prohibits entering or being present in a prohibited roadway when the roadway is open 
to traffic.  
436 See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(6)(D) (2014); Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Bonney Lake MC 
§ 9.11.060(A) (2016); Centralia MC § 10.37.020(B)(4) (2014); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(d) (2010); Everett MC 
§ 9.52.010(A)(1) (1987); Federal Way RMC § 6.35.030(2)(b) (1994); Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(A)(4) (2008); Lacey MC 
§ 5.21.040(B) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(2) (2008); Marysville MC § 6.37.020(2)(d) (2012); Monroe MC 
§ 9.35.020(A)(4) (2008); Puyallup MC § 9A.08.020(2)(c) (2009); Sunnyside MC § 5.22.050(C) (2007); Tacoma MC 
§  8.13.A.020(B)(3) (2007); Wenatchee MC §  6A.13.020(3) (1989). 
437 Of course, even facially neutral laws may be disproportionately enforced against people experiencing 
homelessness such that the laws become another mechanism for criminalizing individuals with no reasonable 
alternative. See Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37. 
438 Tacoma MC § 8.13A.040 (2007). 





 § 8.13A.040 Solicitation by 
Coercion 




▪ “It is unlawful for a 
person to solicit by 
coercion.”440 
▪ Coercion means “to 
block, either 
individually or as part 
of a group of persons, 
the passage of a 
solicited person.”441 
 
▪ Obstruct pedestrian traffic 
means to “walk, stand, sit, lie, 
or place an object in such a 
manner as to block passage 
by another person.”442 
▪ A person is guilty of 
pedestrian interference “if he 
or she intentionally obstructs 
pedestrian traffic.”443 
Penalty ▪ Gross misdemeanor. 
▪ Fine of $5,000, 
incarceration up to 
one year, or both fine 
and imprisonment.444 
▪ Misdemeanor. 
▪  Fine not to exceed $1000, 
imprisonment not to exceed 
90 days, or both fine and 
imprisonment.445 
 
This table illustrates how Tacoma’s two ordinances overlap to prohibit almost the exact 
same behavior—blocking pedestrian traffic. However, the difference in the Solicitation by 
Coercion ordinance is that the behavior of blocking pedestrian traffic is combined with making 
a solicitation.446  Tacoma defines solicitation as “ask[ing], beg[ging]. . . whether orally or in a 
printed manner, for the purpose of immediately receiving contributions. . . .”447 Again, this is a 
content-based restriction on speech because an enforcing officer would have to listen to the 
solicitor’s message before determining if the solicitor violated the law, and because it allows 
solicitations for other means, such as registering others to vote. Further, Tacoma’s Solicitation 
by Coercion statute has a drastically different penalty for engaging in a constitutionally 
protected form of speech, causing due process issues to likely arise due to arbitrary 
enforcement.  
 
                                                             
440 Tacoma MC § 8.13A.040 (2007). 
441 Tacoma MC § 8.13A.020 (2007). 
442 Tacoma MC § 8.13.030 (1991). 
443 Tacoma MC § 8.13.030 (1991). 
444 Tacoma MC § 8.13A.060 (2007). Interestingly, Tacoma’s Solicitation by Coercion has steeper penalties than the 
city’s Sexual Assault Ordinance. Tacoma MC § 8.12.090 (1987) (“Any person convicted of sexual assault shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
445 Tacoma MC § 8.13.030 (1991). 
446 Tacoma MC § 8.13A.040 (2007). 
447 Tacoma MC § 8.13A.020(I) (2007). Tacoma defines solicit as “Solicit and all derivative forms of solicit means to 
ask, beg, solicit, or plead, whether orally or in a written or printed manner, for the purpose of immediately receiving 
contributions, alms, charity, or gifts of items of value for oneself or another person.” Id. (emphasis added). Only if 
the solicitor was asking for an immediate contribution would the solicitor be in violation of the law because the 




Overall, aggressive begging laws consistently raise constitutional and policy concerns. 
The perception-based component, in almost every aggressive begging ordinance, provides no 
guidance to people experiencing homelessness on how to conform their conduct in a manner 
consistent with the law. Adding enumerated lists of prohibited behavior rarely helps. More 
often than not, these enumerated lists raise questions of vagueness and are suspect to 
overbreadth challenges because they have the potential of chilling peaceful requests 
accompanying such behavior.  
 
If public safety is the true aim of aggressive 
begging laws, these laws should be triggered only if 
someone begging is engaged in objectively 
aggressive, threatening, or harassing behavior—
behavior that already constitutes a crime in virtually 
every jurisdiction. Given the scope of protection 
already afforded by existing criminal codes, 
aggressive begging laws are unnecessary and 
overbroad, especially because they so often apply to 
otherwise peaceful begging—a form of free speech. If 
particular conduct would not trigger liability under 
existing assault or harassment laws, then the 
conclusion is obvious: the conduct is not unlawful, 
even in the context of solicitation. 
 
  
If public safety is the true 
aim of aggressive begging 
laws, they should be 
triggered only if someone 
begging is engaged in 
objectively aggressive 
behavior—conduct that 
already constitutes a crime 




























Washington State’s pervasive policy of restricting begging as a form of disfavored 
speech prompts four key recommendations: (1) peaceful begging should not be criminalized; 
(2) cities should repeal laws that apply to peaceful begging; (3) aggressive begging laws should 
be repealed; and (4) cities should recognize peaceful begging as a legitimate plea for help. 
 
A. Peaceful Begging Should Not Be Criminalized 
  
First, as evidenced by the data collected, cities are criminalizing peaceful begging 
through implementing geographical, distance, time, and manner restrictions on begging. As 
demonstrated, these restrictions work to chill and prohibit First Amendment protected speech 
and violate individuals’ due process rights. The First Amendment and Due Process Clause are 
hallmarks of America’s society; any negative impact on these rights is a direct attack on the 
United States Constitution. 
 
  
                                                             






Research has shown that criminalization ordinances are ineffective at addressing the 
root causes of homelessness.449 Civil and criminal penalties charged by anti-begging laws are 
significant,450 hearings and jail time can lead to unemployment, probation conditions can be 
impossible to comply with,451 and a criminal record can prevent individuals from being eligible 
for housing subsidies and federal benefits.452 Cities can easily expend vast amounts of 
resources defending the legality of these ordinances, only to have courts repeatedly affirm that 
begging is a form of protected speech worthy of the highest constitutional scrutiny.453 
 
                   454 
With these geographic, distance, and time restrictions, cities are punishing peaceful, 
constitutionally protected behavior. The data collected shows that cities often severely punish 
violations as misdemeanors. These misdemeanors carry real, collateral consequences that 
severely affect an individual’s ability to gain housing, employment, and government 
benefits.455  Even where begging is punished by fines, “civil sanctions do not provide for the 
                                                             
449 NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 36. 
450 NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 34 (stating that “costs resulting from criminalization measures ... are 
present at multiple stages of the criminal justice process,” and people experiencing homelessness are often unable 
to pay, resulting in increased jail time, suspension of their driver’s license, and poor credit); see also Joseph Shapiro, 
As Court Fees Rise, the Poor are Paying the Price, NPR.ORG (May 19, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor.  
451 NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 37 (“[H]omeless people are more prone to violate their probation due to 
practical difficulties in complying with the ordered conditions. Maintaining a stable location where they can be 
monitored by probation officers, affording public transportation to and from required appointments, and remaining 
out of high crime areas can all be difficult, if not impossible, conditions for homeless people to comply with.”). 
452 Id. at 32–33. 
453 The exact cost of defending such lawsuits is worthy of further research. Unfortunately, some cities are highly 
resistant toward compliance with the Public Records Act and transparency in government overall. Poor public 
access to municipal data and records is a finding that has been noted by HRAP researchers for years.  Olson & 
MacDonald, supra note 37. 
454 Rhodan, supra note  7. 

















same due process protections as criminal penalties.”456 Further, these fines contribute to the 
debtor’s prison when individuals cannot pay them.  
 
Ultimately, criminalization measures—including anti-begging ordinances—waste 
taxpayer dollars because they cycle people experiencing homelessness through the costly 
criminal justice system with no meaningful results.457 Providing reasonable housing options to 
those in need is more effective than processing people through the criminal justice system.458 
This brief uncovers a consistent theme: cities are eager to circumvent the free speech and due 
process rights of homeless residents to lift pressure from business owners and residents. But 
local and national jurisprudence increasingly suggests that courts will not permit cities to 
restrict peaceful requests for help under the guise of public safety. Cities should work to create 
solutions to homelessness that will help individuals, rather than worsen the homelessness 
crisis. 
Time, distance, place, and manner of begging 
regulations are the predominant means by which 
municipalities attempt to avoid strict scrutiny. However, 
these regulations are still subject to strict scrutiny if they 
facially restrict a particular type of expression, such as 
solicitation for donations.459 The Washington State 
Supreme Court recently demonstrated its own commitment to interpreting these laws as they 
are: content-based restrictions on speech in areas traditionally considered public fora.460 Put 
more simply, many of Washington’s begging restrictions would not survive judicial scrutiny. 
Municipalities should take careful note and begin repealing these laws that would not survive a 
costly judicial challenge. 
                                                             
456 NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 37–38 (emphasizing that “a homeless person who has received a ticket 
does not have the right to an attorney or the right to secure a jury trial . . . even though the person may be 
incarcerated later for failure to pay the underlying fine”). 
457See generally Howard & Tran, supra note 91 (finding that investment in permanent housing in just two cities, 
rather than utilizing criminalization strategies, could save taxpayers over $2 million in criminal justice and other 
costs every year); see NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 38 (reporting that “[o]ver 11 million people are cycled 
through our nation’s jails each year, costing local governments approximately $22 billion annually”).  
458 NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 47 (explaining that research demonstrates “permanent supportive 
housing saves public resources, improves communities by reducing street homelessness, and improves the health 
and well-being of homeless people”); see also NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63 (summarizing that 
criminalization measures often “create additional barriers” to resources needed to escape homelessness); 
Sylvestre, supra note 73, at 1 (showing how “prevalent stereotypes and prejudice faced by homeless persons as they 
are policed and criminalized, both historically and in the present, are perpetuating disadvantage and have occluded 
consideration of the broader structural causes of homelessness”).  
459 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015) see also Thayer v. City of Worchester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 
233-34 (D. Mass. 2015).   
460 See City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016). Although four justices in the lead opinion held 
that two particular “time, place, and manner” provisions of Lakewood’s ordinance were unconstitutional, two 
other justices determined that the entire ordinance was facially overbroad, “substantially restrict[ing] protected 
speech in a wide range of public forums traditionally open to First Amendment activity.” Id. at 228 (Stephens, J., 
dissenting). 
 
Many of Washington’s 
begging restrictions 






B. Repeal Laws that Apply to Peaceful Begging 
 
Second, cities should repeal ordinances that prohibit or restrict peaceful begging. Cities 
can act as gatekeepers for their resident’s constitutional rights, and they should treat that 
opportunity seriously. “Our [C]onstitution enshrines the principle that government exists to 
protect the rights of all citizens, and has no legitimate power to deprive any citizen or class of 
citizen of their rights without due process of the law.”461 Due to the nature of these laws and 
the influence of the fear of visible poverty, the laws are likely to be enforced in a discriminatory 
manner,462 infringing individuals’ due process rights.  
 
 Although businesses and cities receive complaints 
regarding the presence of panhandlers and the act of 
begging, cities must consider the true motivation behind 
these complaints. Cities respond to the fear of visible 
poverty by implementing these laws that restrict 
begging.463 However, cities and local governments have 
no power to deprive citizens of their constitutional rights, 
regardless of how strong the public’s aversion to visible 
poverty is. People experiencing homelessness are already 
marginalized; cities should proactively try to protect already vulnerable groups, rather than 
implementing and maintaining laws that reinforce stigma and isolation. As individuals 
experiencing homelessness “become more marginalized over time. . . they are by definition 
less able to access the resources needed to maintain stable housing.”464 These laws not only 
criminalize constitutionally protected behavior, but they work to further marginalize 
individuals experiencing homelessness and contribute to the cycle of homelessness.  
 
The city of Olympia provides a proactive example of how cities can protect the 
constitutional rights of its residents. In Olympia, the city attorney’s office routinely reads court 
decisions that may affect Olympia’s municipal code.465 The attorney’s office will then discuss 
potential impacts within the legal department, and will suggest to the city manager that staff 
bring a proposed ordinance for the city council to amend the city code if necessary.466 After 
advice from the city attorney’s office, the Olympia city council recently decided to remove 
                                                             
461 Is the Constitution Important?, BILL OF RIGHTS INST. (Oct. 21, 2011), https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/is-the-
constitution-important/.  
462 Supra Part I, Section C. 
463 Supra Part I, Section A. 
464 Ben Alexander-Eitzman, Substance Abuse, Marginalization, and Homelessness: Bayesian Perspectives on a 
Persisting Problem, WASH. UNIV. ST. LOUIS OPEN SCHOLARSHIP 21 (May 24, 2009), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1877&context=etd.  
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references to panhandling from its municipal code in response to Lakewood v. Willis.467  
Olympia’s municipal code had prohibited panhandling within twenty-five feet of an ATM or 
parking station and banned aggressive panhandling.468 Olympia defined panhandling as “any 
solicitation made in person, requesting an immediate donation of money or things of 
value…”469 The city noted that its definition was “problematic because of the Lakewood ruling 
given that our definition targets speech based on its content—a solicitation for a donation of 
money or thing of value—and prohibits that conduct in places historically recognized as a 
traditional public forum, such as sidewalks and other ‘public places.’”470 The city attorney’s 
office presented the city council with three options: “1. Approve the proposed ordinance 
amending OMC Section 9.16.180, Pedestrian Interference on second reading. 2. Direct staff to 
make different or additional amendments to OMC Section 9.16.180, Pedestrian Interference. 
3. Decide not to approve the proposed ordinance. This option creates a potential liability risk 
for the City.”471 The city council subsequently voted to remove references of panhandling from 
its city code.472  
 
Olympia recognized that its ordinance imposed content-based restrictions on the 
freedom of speech,473 and that the Lakewood v. Willis rendered the ordinance 
unconstitutional.474 Olympia’s removal of panhandling from its municipal code illustrates that 
other cities within Washington can do the same thing—they can repeal ordinances that 
prohibit peaceful begging. Just as Olympia identified, cities can risk liability for having laws 
that restricting peaceful begging.475 At the least, that risk should motivate cities to revisit and 
repeal ordinances that restrict peaceful begging. 
 
C. Repeal Aggressive Begging Laws 
 
Third, aggressive begging laws that are duplicative of preexisting ordinances should be 
repealed unless they provide for a lower penalty for engaging in a constitutionally protected 
behavior. These overlapping ordinances often result in arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement while simultaneously infringing on individuals’ due process rights. Cities are 
prohibited from “[catering] to the preference of one group,” such as business owners or 
financially secure individuals, “to avoid the expressive acts of others,” such as begging.476 
                                                             
467 Abby Spegman, Olympia Gets Rid of its Anti-Panhandling Rules Following State Supreme Court Decision, 
OLYMPIAN (Jan. 6, 2018, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicupload/eclips/2018%2001%2008%20Olympia%20gets%20rid%20of%2
0its%20anti%20panhandling%20rules%20following%20state%20Supreme%20Court%20decision.pdf. 
468 Id.; Olympia MC § 9.16.180 (1993) (amended 2018). 
469 Olympia MC § 9.16.180 (1993) (amended 2018). 
470 Olympia City Staff Report 1 (on file with author). 
471 Olympia City Staff Report 1 (on file with author). 
472  Spegman, supra note 467; Olympia MC § 9.16.180 (1993) (amended 2018). 
473 Olympia City Staff Report 1 (on file with author). 
474 Harksen, supra note 465. 
475 As illustrated by the case studies contained in this brief. Supra Part III. 





Because these ordinances disproportionately affect visibly poor people and are content-based 
restrictions on speech, they must be necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest.477 
Cities should examine their aggressive begging laws and determine whether those laws target 
behavior already covered by other laws. 
 
Objectively aggressive behavior is already addressed by existing laws via assault and 
harassment laws. For example, the City of Kennewick recognized that its own aggressive 
begging ordinance would not withstand judicial scrutiny and repealed its ordinance, noting 
that its municipal code already adequately addressed the public safety concerns that its 
aggressive begging law did.479 Kennewick recognized a distinction between peaceful 
constitutionally protected begging and objectively aggressive behavior. Accordingly, the city 
took the affirmative step of repealing its aggressive begging ordinance, both removing itself 
from risk of legal liability, while respecting the 
constitutional rights of its residents. Ideally, more 
Washington’s cities should follow and assess their anti-
begging laws to determine whether their laws would pass 
judicial scrutiny. Further, when Olympia removed its 
references to aggressive panhandling, the city did not 
consider any potential negative pushback it might receive 
from residents or business owners because panhandling is 
protected by the United States Constitution.480 Similar to 
Kennewick, Olympia’s Deputy City Attorney noted there 
are other laws addressing the objectively unlawful conduct 
purportedly addressed by aggressive begging 
ordinances—laws such as disorderly conduct and 
harassment—which means there are other ways to target 
the unacceptable behavior “without eroding someone’s 
First Amendment rights.”481  
 
Perception-based triggers in aggressive begging laws sweep in a staggering array of 
otherwise peaceful behaviors. These triggers target the speaker or the message, not the 
conduct. Peaceful begging can trigger a violation because begging itself —or even just the 
presence of a visibly poor person—commonly provokes feelings of anxiety, fear, or compulsion 
in others. Such laws risk suppressing even lawful speech and leave cities open to vagueness 
                                                             
477 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226–28, 2231; McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144, at *25; Browne, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1288, 1287–
90; see also NLCHP, Criminalization of Homelessness at 18; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 31. 
478 Harksen, supra note 465. 
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and due process challenges.482 Aggressive begging ordinances are especially troubling because 
the majority of these impose criminal penalties.483  
 
Yet these laws represent a growing trend among Washington cities. Cities implement 
anti-begging laws to allegedly remedy a harm that occurs when individuals stand on the 
sidewalk with a sign asking for help; however, no harm actually occurs from asking for help.484 
In reality, cities are using anti-begging laws to address visible poverty, not to address 
homelessness.485 Such a justification cannot support the broad curtailing of constitutional 
liberties, especially one as precious and central to democracy as free speech. Aside from 
constitutional concerns, Washington cities must grapple with the fact that as long as poverty 
exists, some people must ask strangers for help.  
 
D. Recognize Peaceful Begging as a Protected Plea for Help 
 
Finally, cities should recognize peaceful begging as a 
plea for help. Municipalities increasingly enact laws with the 
explicit or even unconscious impact of removing visible 
poverty from public view. This spike continues even though 
these laws are less effective and more expensive than non-
punitive alternatives to poverty and homelessness, such as 
social services and affordable housing.486  
 
Cities should consider the implicit and unconscious biases that motivate these begging 
restrictions, and with that knowledge work to be strong advocates for individuals experiencing 
homelessness. Cities have the opportunity and the power to impact the lives of their residents, 
how we respond to human need and human desperation reflects our collective moral compass. 
 
  
                                                             
482 See, e.g., Browne, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1286, 1297. 
483 See supra text and chart accompanying notes 187–189. 
484 Talner, supra note 17. 
485 Id.  
486 Howard & Tran, supra note 91.  
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Part III: Methodology 
 
A.  Master Chart Methodology 
 
 HRAP researchers analyzed municipal codes laws of sixty-four cities across the state of 
Washington, searching for ordinances that work to prohibit begging. At the time of selection, 
the sixty-four cities chosen were the most populous in the State, with an additional few chosen 
in an attempt to capture all geographic areas across the State. Researchers then used the 
Municipal Research and Services Center (MSRC), a nonprofit website, to locate the municipal 
codes for each city. The resulting “Master Chart” cited to throughout this brief was created and 
is on file with the authors.  
   
 Using the 2010 Census, researchers collected demographic data on each of the sampled 
cities. Researchers analyzed the data to determine whether there was any correlation between 
a city’s ordinances and its: population density, median household income, percentage of 
residents below the poverty level, and racial makeup. Researchers did not find any significant 
correlations. 
 
 Using MRSC, and the search function for each municipal code being sampled, HRAP 
researchers then searched the city code for references to panhandling, including key words 
such as 
 
 Panhandle  Solicit  Beg  Aggressive 
 Panhandling  Soliciting Begging Solicitation 
 Panhandles  Solicits  Begs  Automated Teller Machine 
 Panhandler  Solicitor Beggar ATM 
 
Researchers then manually analyzed each ordinance containing a key word. Researchers also 
did a manual check of common code sections, including the criminal code, public health, park 







Once an ordinance was identified as a “begging restriction,” the ordinance was 
classified into one of four categories: (1) zone/geographic restrictions, (2) distance restrictions, 
(3) Time Restrictions, and (4) Manner restrictions (i.e. aggressive panhandling). Researchers 
created the master chart, with the following categories:  
 
Demographic Data Ordinance Specific Data 
Total Population Total Anti-Panhandling Ordinances 
Population Density (Persons per Square 
Mile) 
Dates of Enactment-Total 
Persons Below Poverty Level, Percent, 2009-
2013 
Total Ordinances with Zone/Geographic 
Restrictions 
Median Household Income, 2009-2013 Total Ordinances with Distance Restrictions 
Percentage Households Earning Less than 
$15,000  
Specific Ordinances with Distance 
Restrictions 
Veterans, 2009-2013  Dates of Enactment - Distance Restrictions  
Demographic - Caucasian, 2010  
 
Language of Distance Restrictions: How Far 
From Where?  
Demographic - African American, 2010  Total Ordinances with Time Restrictions 
Demographic - Asian, 2010  Specific Ordinances with Time Restrictions  
Demographic - American Indian or Alaska 
Native, 2010 
Dates of Enactment - Time Restrictions  
 
 Total Ordinances with "Aggressive" 
Panhandling Limitations 
 Specific Ordinances with "Aggressive" 
Panhandling Limitations 
 Dates of Enactment - "Aggressive" 
Panhandling 
 "Aggressive" Panhandling Defined?  
 "Aggressive" Definition Based on Objective 
Conduct? 
 "Aggressive" Definition Based on Reception? 
 Penalties (Civil infraction or Misdemeanor) 




The data from the ordinance was inputted into the master chart: a spreadsheet created 
in Microsoft Excel. Several researchers reviewed the chart at various stages to ensure accuracy. 
The last review was completed in March 2018. Researchers used the “sort” function in 
Microsoft Excel to sort the data in the master chart, allowing researchers to spot trends and 
possible correlations. Researchers then used the “chart” function in Microsoft Word to create 





B. Enforcement Data Methodology 
 
 For the enforcement data, HRAP sent requests for public record information to eleven 
cities. The cities chosen were the cities used in the case study section of the brief, as well as 
eight additional cities in order to obtain enforcement data on ten “aggressive begging” laws. 
An example request is included in the appendix below. HRAP researchers followed up with 
cities via email and phone. 
 
 Once the requests were received, researchers discovered that many cities were not 
enforcing the ordinances via measures such as arrests and citations. A google search 
discovered that “move-along” orders were prevalent in Centralia. Researchers then contacted 
each city to ask whether the city had a routine of issuing “move-along” orders rather than 
formal citations. No cities stated that they had a formal policy. However, when considering the 
prevalence of move-along orders in other contexts, as well as the information discovered 
regarding Centralia, researchers concluded that cities are likely issuing informal “move-along” 
orders to individuals experiencing homelessness. Statements from professionals throughout 
the community confirmed that move-along orders are prevalent in Seattle.  
 
C. Scope of Methodology 
 
 While HRAP’s methodology was effective, it is not without a few restrictions. First, 
HRAP researchers only considered codified ordinances. As HRAP researchers noted years 
earlier in Washington’s WAR, “there is a very real risk that ordinances may have been enacted 
or amended but not included in online databases.”490 Second, while researchers attempted to 
use key language that would trigger most ordinances, it is possible that some ordinances 




                                                             










[Via email:   ] 
 
RE: Public Records Act Request – Citation Information for [city] Municipal Code  
 
To Whom It May Concern:  
 
I am requesting that the records described below be made available for inspection, pursuant to 
the Washington Public Records Act (RCW §42.56 et seq.). In accordance with RCW 42.56.520, 
you must, within five business days of receipt of this request, respond and let me know the 
status of the request and how soon you will be able to produce all discoverable records.  
I am requesting certain information (see specific questions below) pertaining to citations 
issued due to violations of the following [city] Municipal Code:  
 
[specific ordinance];  
[specific ordinance].  
 
Specifically, I am requesting all relevant records related to the following questions for the time 
period between January 1, 2013, and January 1, 2018.  Please separate each of the responses by 
ordinance and by year:  
1. How many total citations were issued under each of the city codes specified above, for 
each year? 
 
2. How many of these citations resulted in misdemeanor charges against the recipient? 
A. How many of these charges resulted in convictions?  
B. How many citation recipients spent time in jail as a result? 
i. How much time did each recipient spend in jail? 
C. How many citation recipients spent time in police custody as a result of these 
citations? 
i. How much time did they spend in law enforcement custody? 
 
3. How many of these citations resulted in fines assessed against the recipient? 
A. What was the amount of fines assessed for each citation?  
B. How many fines were dismissed before payment? 





D. How many fines resulted in a default? 
i. How many defaulted fines resulted in further charges, such as failure to 
appear or pay charges, against the citation recipient? 
 
4. How many of these citations resulted in a failure to appear?  
 
5. Do you maintain records that may indicate whether a citation recipient is homeless or 
staying in temporary housing such as a shelter or an encampment?  
A. How many of the citations (by ordinance and by year) were issued to people 
who were experiencing homelessness? 
B. How many of the citations (by ordinance and by year) were issued to people 
who were not able to provide a residential address? 
C. How many of the citations (by ordinance and by year) were issued to people 
who were staying in an encampment or temporary shelter? 
D. If you cannot produce the data in response to 5.A., 5.B, or 5.C, in how many 
instances did recipients of these citations provide the same residential address?  
Put another way, in how many instances was the same address recorded for 
recipients of these citations? 
 
6. What was the race of each individual cited if identified? 
 
7. What was the gender of each individual cited if identified? 
 
8. For citations issued under [ordinance number], how many of those citation recipients 
simultaneously received citations for assault [applicable ordinance number], battery  
[applicable ordinance number], or harassment [applicable ordinance number]. 
A. Among the results for request #8, how many of these defendants was offered 
(or accepted) a plea deal? 
 
If the City of [city name] does not track the data related to any of the requests above, please 
let us know. 
 
At this time, please refrain from making hard copies of any responsive documents. The 
production of data in electronic form is preferred. If the records are available electronically, 
please specify what electronic forms are available, as well as any cost associated with 
accessing this electronic form. You may send any written responses to this request by email to 




If any documents or responses are withheld in whole or in part, please specify the reason for 
withholding such document or response or any portion thereof. To the extent that portions of 
the request are specifically exempted from disclosure, please provide all non-exempt portions 




requested records contain classified information, please redact such information and furnish 
the requested records.  
 
We very much appreciate your attention to this request. If you would like to contact me with 
questions or concerns about the requested information, please feel free to do so as I am more 
than happy to clarify in any way I can. Please contact me with any questions at [contact 
information]. 
  
I look forward to hearing from you within five business days. Thank you for your assistance!  
 
Sincerely,  
 
[Name] 
[Affiliation] 
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